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1
Introduction and Summary
The U.S. unemployment insurance (UI) system is unique in the
world in that it is financed by an experience-rated payroll tax. This
means that individual firms pay higher or lower UI taxes depending on
whether they cause more or less unemployment and unemployment
benefit payments. Experience rating internalizes the costs of unem
ployment to individual firms, thereby inducing them to stabilize
employment patterns. Hence, experience rating may lead to a reduction
in layoffs and in unemployment.
Since the inception of the federal-state UI system in the mid-1930s,
the experience-rating provisions have been vigorously debated among
politicians, trade unionists, business people, and academic economists.
The last comprehensive treatment of all aspects of experience rating
was undertaken by Joseph M. Becker, whose seminal book on this
topic was published in 1972. His views were restated, with minor mod
ifications, in his 1981 monograph. Becker©s work was followed by the
contributions of Feldstein (1976), Brechling (1977), and Baily (1978).
The early literature was surveyed by Hamermesh (1977, 1978), Gustman (1982), and Topel and Welch (1980).

The Need for Research
In the research underlying this book, we have reexamined the role of
experience rating in the UI system. Such a reconsideration is needed
because of recent changes in labor market conditions, including the
growth in permanent employment reductions due to major downsizing
by some large employers, increased numbers of plant closures, and
bankruptcies. Large structural shifts in economic activity and employ
ment took place in the 1980s, and they are likely to continue. Thus, the
question arises as to whether the present UI system and, in particular,
its experience-rating provisions are capable of coping adequately with
the consequences of the substantial reallocation of labor. Our research
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is aimed at providing some answers to this important economic and
political question.
Current systems of experience rating seem to be well designed to
allocate the costs of unemployment caused by temporary, easily pre
dictable, and recurrent layoffs. Such layoffs do not lead to significant
permanent employment changes. There are valid arguments for allocat
ing the costs of temporary layoffs to the firms that caused them. Fur
ther, in most states, it seems that the existing experience-rating systems
can be modified to allocate these costs to the appropriate firms.
Most theoretical and empirical investigations of the UI system have
been based on models of temporary layoffs. For instance, the influen
tial article by Feldstein (1976) and later contributions by Wolcowitz
(1984) and Cook (1992), all employ an approach, similar to that of
early implicit contract theories, in which employees have a lasting
attachment to a particular firm, but are laid off periodically and later
recalled in a fairly predictable manner. In these models, UI benefits are
a means of raising workers© incomes during periods of temporary
unemployment, and, so the argument goes, these benefits ought to be
regarded as part of the firm©s labor costs. If, by contrast, UI benefits
were financed by a general payroll (or other) tax not based on an expe
rience rating, there might be more layoffs, and high-layoff firms would
receive a permanent subsidy from low-layoff firms. As a result, highlayoff activities would be expanded. Experience rating clearly leads to
increased efficiency and social well-being, at least from a long-run per
spective.
In much of the UI research, experience rating is modeled in a fairly
abstract manner. For example, following Feldstein©s original contribu
tion, many researchers have described experience rating simply by the
ratio of total benefits charged to the tax payments of employers. The
reserve ratio method of experience rating, which is the most commonly
used approach, has been modeled by Brechling (1977) and, more
recently, by Wolcowitz (1984) and Cook (1992). Cook has extended
the work to the benefit ratio method, the other important technique of
experience rating. Both approaches imply that experience rating is
imperfect in the sense that (1) there are substantial lags between the
payments of benefits to workers and the corresponding receipt of UI
taxes, and (2) there are maximum and minimum tax rates that curtail or
even suspend the relationship between benefits and taxes. Although
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these features of the UI tax systems have been modeled in an insightful
manner by both Wolcowitz and Cook, neither examines the effects of
permanent employment reductions.
Suppose now that a substantial proportion of total layoffs is perma
nent, necessitated by some structural development, such as changes in
tastes, new technologies, or competition from imports. Some plants
may have to close completely, some may go into bankruptcy, and oth
ers may experience substantial downsizing. In any case, employment
in the industry must contract substantially. From a social point of view,
who should bear the unemployment costs of these layoffs? Is experi
ence rating a desirable property of the UI system? Do present experi
ence-rating methods allocate these costs appropriately? These types of
questions have not been considered in the previous literature on experi
ence rating. Consequently, we have addressed these issues in our
research for this book.

Study Results
Our work has produced a number of findings. First, permanent
employment reductions amount to about 70 percent of total employ
ment reductions. While employment reductions are not necessarily the
same as layoffs, our evidence, using UI data for Texas for 1978-89,
together with some previous results, indicates that permanent layoffs
are a significant proportion of total layoffs. Thus, our analysis of expe
rience rating in the context of permanent layoffs seems justified.
Second, based on our theoretical model, the socially optimal rate of
moving labor from contracting to expanding sectors can be achieved
only when the transfer costs are borne either by the laid-off employee
or by the employer in the contracting industry. The agent who pays for
the transfer costs must also control the rate of transfer of labor.
Wages and prices adjust to different payment mechanisms to bring
about the same socially optimal rate of labor transfer. Even if wages
are not fully flexible, the socially optimal rate of transfer may still be
achieved by charging the costs to the employer in the contracting sec
tor. Furthermore, under the current system, laid-off workers are paid
UI benefits on the condition that they actively search for alternative
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employment. Although this requirement is enforced with varying vigor
in the states, it is designed to ensure that workers are, indeed, trans
ferred to the expanding sectors at a socially optimal rate.
When the agent who pays for the adjustment costs does not control
the rate of layoffs or hiring, there tends to be a large, nonoptimal
adjustment of labor, or high structural unemployment. Since the gov
ernment is usually not able to control the rate of transfer of labor, pay
ment of the adjustment costs by the government (financed, for
example, from general revenues) is nonoptimal. It may be argued that
government financing is justified, to the extent that markets bring about
too slow an adjustment. However, we conclude that, in general, experi
ence rating (charging the costs of unemployment back to the contract
ing employers) generates socially beneficial results. This conclusion
reinforces the finding that, with only temporary layoffs, increases in
the degree of experience rating tend to lead to improvements in the
allocation of resources.
Third, when layoffs are permanent, payroll taxes are not an ideal
way of implementing experience rating. Temporary layoffs leave the
taxable payroll (that is, the tax base) more or less unchanged, while
permanent layoffs reduce the taxable payroll. Suppose, for example,
that a firm©s layoffs increase and that the UI benefits received by the
laid-off workers are charged to the firm©s account. If the layoffs are
temporary, the taxable payroll remains more or less constant, and tax
payments increase after a lag. If, by contrast, the layoffs are permanent,
the taxable payroll and, hence, the firm©s tax payments fall immedi
ately. After a lag, the firm©s tax rate and tax payments may rise to reim
burse partially the UI system. In the limiting case, when the firm goes
out of business, its taxable payroll and tax liabilities fall to zero. Thus,
the charged benefits can never be recovered.
Our analysis shows that, under both systems of experience rating,
UI tax liabilities are less than the benefit costs of permanent layoffs. In
particular, when the firm is and remains at the maximum or minimum
tax rate, it receives a tax reward for laying off workers permanently.
This is the very opposite result to that intended by experience rating.
When the firm©s long-run position is on the experience-rated portion
of the tax schedule and the maximum tax rate applies only temporarily,
then the reserve ratio method of experience rating, because of its
longer memory, tends to generate a higher ratio of taxes to benefit costs
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than is true with the benefit ratio method. In other words, the reserve
ratio method tends to internalize a higher proportion of benefit costs
than is true with the benefit ratio method.
We conclude this book with suggested economic policy changes.
These recommendations are designed to increase the degree of experi
ence rating and the degree of internalization of the costs of unemploy
ment. Some of our policy suggestions have been made before:
increasing or abolishing the maximum and minimum tax rates and
shortening the lag between benefit charges and tax increases would
improve the performance of the systems.
Our relatively new policy suggestions refer to the reserve ratio
method of experience rating. First, positive balances in the UI trust
fund should be treated as part of the employer©s assets, and negative
balances should be considered as liabilities. Second, upon bankruptcy,
the firm©s positive or negative balance in the UI trust fund should be
counted as part of business assets or liabilities. Moreover, the UI trust
fund ought to be allowed to claim reimbursement for part or all of the
firm©s UI liabilities in bankruptcy proceedings. Third, interest should
be paid to the firm on its positive balances and charged on its negative
balances. Together with the abolition of the maximum and minimum
tax rates, these provisions could ensure the complete internalization of
the costs of permanent as well as of temporary layoffs.
Much of the analysis underlying this study is abstract and mathe
matical. In our exposition we have attempted to present the arguments
and principal findings first in intuitive terms and then more formally.
We hope that this structure, which inevitably leads to some duplication,
makes the research meaningful to a larger readership than would be the
case with a tight mathematical presentation.

Principles of Insurance and the

Current Structure of U.S.
Unemployment Insurance Financing
In this chapter, we sketch the background to the central analysis pre
sented in the remainder of the book. First, we discuss briefly the major
principles of insurance and the manner in which experience rating
operates. Second, systems of unemployment insurance (UI) without
and with experience rating are outlined and analyzed. Third, the two
chief experience-rating methods currently used in the U.S. are
described. We then briefly review some of the relevant recent theoreti
cal literature on experience rating.

Some Basic Principles of Insurance
Insurance is a contract in which an individual pays premiums to an
insurer, who promises to compensate the insurant for a loss caused by
some unpredictable circumstance covered by the agreement. Thus,
insurance is a hedge against the costs of uncertain events. Risk aver
sion on the part of the insurant and the ability of the insurer to pool
risks make insurance possible, likely, and generally efficient from an
economic perspective.
Insurance may, however, entail some inefficiencies. Most notably,
the so-called moral hazard problem arises when the insurant has some
control over the insured event. For example, an insured business owner
facing bankruptcy might hire an arsonist; if the owner could easily
arrange for the burning of the business, insurers would be unwilling to
provide insurance. Thus, for private insurance markets to exist, the
insurer must be able to control moral hazard at a low cost.
In well-functioning insurance markets, the price of insurance,
namely, the premium, is set at a level such that the present value of the
stream of the insurant©s premiums is just equal to the expected present
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value of the individual©s insurance claims plus the cost of administer
ing the contract, all measured over an appropriately long period of
time. Insurants with similar risks of loss are grouped together into a
risk class and are charged the same insurance premium. Thus, within a
risk class, insurance claims and premiums tend to offset one another,
both over time and across different insurants. In other words, risks are
pooled both over time and among different members of the same risk
class. As a consequence, over an appropriate span of time, the mem
bers of the risk class finance their own claims, producing neither a sur
plus nor a deficit. In any particular year, any member of the risk class
may, of course, have a deficit or a surplus with the pool.
It follows that an insurant©s weekly, monthly, or annual insurance
premiums will differ according to the risk class to which that individ
ual is assigned. For example, teenagers pay higher automobile insur
ance premiums than do adults, house insurance is more expensive for
dwellings located near frequent mud slides or in a hurricane area, life
insurance is more expensive for people with severe medical conditions,
and so on.
In some types of insurance, in which the insured event occurs
repeatedly, the insurant may be reassigned periodically to a different
risk class, depending on the person©s prior claims experience. This pro
cedure is called experience rating, and it is particularly helpful when
the factors, such as age, sex, and marital status, are not very accurate
predictors of the insurant©s risk class. Thus, if an insurant©s claims
were very low over a period of years, the individual may be assigned to
a lower risk class with a decreased premium. In effect, the experience
rating establishes a link between past insurance claims and the current
insurance premium. Perhaps the best known example of experience rat
ing occurs in automobile insurance in the form of "good driver dis
counts." Experience rating may also be effected through a special levy,
such as deductibles or copayments, when an insurance claim is paid.
Two related aspects of experience rating are of special interest. First,
experience rating implies incentives for the insurant to reduce claims
by either controlling the uncertain events or by not submitting claims.
Experience rating in automobile insurance may induce insurants to
drive more carefully and/or to pay for minor accidental damage out of
their own pockets, so as not to lose the "no claims bonus." In this way,
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experience rating tends to reduce the various forms of moral hazard in
insurance.
Second, experience rating implies that there is participation by the
insurant in the insurance against the occurrence of the uncertain event.
This is the coinsurance aspect of experience rating. The extent of this
participation depends upon the degree of experience rating. As the
degree of experience rating increases, the insurant©s premium (or
copayment) corresponds more and more closely to his/her recent
claims experience, so that the insurant pays more of the bill out-ofpocket.
Suppose, for instance, that the insurant has a claim for $5,000 and
that consequently this individual©s premium either shows no change or
rises immediately by $500 or $5,000. If the premium does not increase,
there is no experience rating. If it rises by $500, there is some degree of
experience rating. If it rises by $5,000, experience rating is extreme in
that the insurant suffers the entire loss. Since the total insurance pre
mium includes a charge for administrative expenses, the insurant will
reject contracts with such severe experience rating conditions: they
impose costs (the $5,000 plus administrative fees) yet offer no insur
ance protection.
Experience rating appears to be particularly effective in discourag
ing relatively small and frequent claims against which insurants are
quite willing to self-insure. Further, since these types of claims tend to
have especially high administrative costs, their elimination is likely to
reduce average insurance premiums.

Experience Rating in Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment insurance (UI) provides a valuable service. If work
ers are risk averse because, while unemployed, they cannot borrow
against the expectations of future earnings, then they are likely to be
willing to pay a premium (possibly in the form of reduced wages) for
insurance that mitigates the effects of income fluctuations. These indi
viduals are willing to exchange an uncertain, fluctuating income stream
for a certain and constant one with a smaller expected present value
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(see Baily 1977, 1978; Stafford 1977; Topel and Welch 1980; Rosen
1983; and Burtless 1990).
In spite of the persuasive arguments for this insurance, private UI
markets have been very limited. Many reasons for this apparent market
failure have been adduced. For instance, Rosen (1977) and Topel and
Welch (1980) ascribe the deficiency to the high concentration of claims
during recessions, which inhibits risk pooling among workers. What
ever the reason, all industrialized societies have seen fit to introduce
public UI systems. In general, these systems are financed out of gen
eral government revenue or by a uniform payroll tax. Only rarely are
taxes imposed on the individual insurants, namely, the workers.
As stated earlier, the UI system in the United States is unique in that
it is financed by a payroll tax assessed on and experience rated for indi
vidual employers. Thus, employers owe higher taxes when the unem
ployment benefits paid to their laid-off employees are larger. Details of
the two most common methods of experience rating are presented later
in this chapter.

Simple Analytical Model of Unemployment Insurance
To illustrate the major consequences of experience rating in unem
ployment insurance, we postulate a simple model that preserves the
essential elements of the various arguments. Assume that there are two
competitive industries, which are identical in all relevant respects
except that one is stable and one is unstable. The stable industry faces a
nonfluctuating demand, whereas the unstable industry is subject to
recurrent demand swings that may be fairly regular (cyclical or sea
sonal) or random. Further, within the unstable industry, the demand
fluctuations are distributed randomly across individual employers. In
the short run, those employers are not affected identically by the vari
ability in industry demand, but over a suitably long period of time, all
employers in the unstable industry experience the same average fluctu
ations. Employers have the ability to mitigate the impact of swings in
demand upon layoffs by means of production smoothing and similar
techniques, which have marginal costs. Employers balance these costs
against the costs of layoffs and rehires and thus determine their optimal
layoff rates.
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We assume that the total labor supply for the entire economy is not
responsive to wage changes (that is, it is perfectly inelastic), although
workers can move between the two industries. All workers are assumed
to be homogeneous in the relevant characteristics, and, in particular, to
have identical degrees of risk aversion. Movements of workers
between industries are sufficiently responsive so that, in the long run,
the net compensation of employees is equalized in the two sectors.
Layoffs are effected by employers, without influence by workers and
are distributed randomly across employees. Workers may have the abil
ity to control the duration of unemployment, however, by accepting or
rejecting new job offers. All of these assumptions can be relaxed with
out affecting the essential results of the following arguments.
We analyze this simple model under four different sets of circum
stances. First, there is no formal UI system, so that employees must
self-insure. This means that workers in the unstable industry must pro
vide for their own income maintenance during periods of unemploy
ment, by saving and/or borrowing. Second, there is private UI financed
by premiums charged to individual workers. Third, there is public UI
financed by a uniform employer tax. Fourth, there is public UI financed
by an experience-rated tax. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
all UI programs are complete, in the sense that they smooth out com
pletely the income fluctuations caused by layoffs.
Self-Insurance by Employees
In the absence of any type of UI program, a reasonably well-func
tioning labor market would generate, at least in the long run, higher
average earnings in the unstable industry than in the stable one. The
absence of earnings during layoffs would be more than offset by high
earnings during periods of employment: the average annual earnings in
the unstable industry would have to compensate risk-averse employees
for the cost and trouble to self-insure against the consequences of lay
offs. Competition in the labor market would maintain this earnings dif
ferential.
Workers in the unstable industry would have an incentive to control
their unemployment duration by accepting any alternative job offers
leading to an increase in earnings. Similarly, employers in the unstable
industry would have an incentive to control layoffs; if they could
reduce layoffs at a sufficiently low marginal cost, they would be able to
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attract workers from the stable industry at lower annual earnings. Lay
off rates, unemployment duration, and earnings would be optimal,
given that risk-averse workers must self-insure against fluctuating
income, in the sense that all agents optimize by equating the appropri
ate marginal costs and benefits.
The allocation of resources between the stable and unstable indus
tries would also tend to be optimal in that the appropriate weight is
given to instability and because workers must self-insure. Any exoge
nous reduction in the degree of volatility would lead to an expansion of
the unstable industry relative to the other sector.
For comparison with the cases described in the following sections,
let us suppose that the smoothly distributed annual earnings in the sta
ble industry are $25,000, while the fluctuating earnings in the unstable
industry are $26,000. The difference of $1,000 represents the cost of
self-insurance.
Private Unemployment Insurance
Consider now that there is a private UI program, which can offer a
constant annual income stream to workers in the unstable industry at a
uniform price per employee that is less than the cost of self-insurance.
An insurance company might be able to offer such a relatively cheap
contract by pooling the risk of income loss both across individual
workers and over time. In practice, the insurance company would have
to charge premiums that might be substantial during periods of
employment and then return most, but not all, of them as benefits dur
ing periods of unemployment. The administrative costs, as well as nor
mal profits for insurance provision, are covered by the difference
between total premiums and total benefit payments. Accordingly, we
define two income concepts for employees in the unstable industry:
gross income is the total average annual income received from the
employer, while net or disposable income is the gross income plus total
benefits received minus total premiums paid. Movement by workers
between the two industries ensures that the net income in the unstable
industry equals the gross income (which is identical to net income) in
the stable industry.
In comparison with the case of workers© self-insurance, relative
labor costs have fallen in the unstable industry, so that there will be a
tendency for it to expand. In other words, since risk pooling through
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insurance has removed part of the undesirable effects of instability, the
activity in the unstable industry is likely to expand at the expense of the
other.
The introduction of private insurance has given rise to two possible
moral hazard problems. First, since the insurance companies pay the
full salary as long as individuals remain unemployed, workers have no
incentive to accept any new job if they value the leisure time afforded
by being unemployed. This "free rider" situation may be avoided par
tially by proper policing of the insurance contract or by increasing
worker participation in the insurance. Clearly, increases in such partic
ipation may be obtained through experience rating of individual work
ers or through benefit payments that decline with the duration of
unemployment.
The second type of moral hazard arises from the behavior of
employers. Employers have no incentive to increase the degree of
employment smoothing because all employees already enjoy even
incomes. Hence, personnel would not be prepared to give up income
for employment stability. Some degree of worker participation in the
insurance may, again, remove part of this moral hazard.
In terms of the previous numerical example, assume that the private
insurance industry can offer insurance at a price of $500 a year. A pos
sible long-run equilibrium may then be established by an annual aver
age (gross and net) income of $25,300 in the stable industry and a
gross average income of $25,800 in the unstable industry, of which
workers pay $500 to insurance companies and retain $25,300 as net
average annual income.
Public Insurance with a Uniform Tax on Employers
We now assume that, in lieu of the private insurance of the last sec
tion, a public UI system is introduced, which is financed by a uniform
tax imposed on all employers in both industries. For simplicity, as
before, we assume that, due to the UI program, all workers in the
unstable industry receive a constant flow of disposable income, includ
ing the unemployment benefits when on layoff. Hence, there is no need
for self-insurance, and competition equalizes disposable incomes in the
two industries.
Suppose that the uniform employer tax is a payroll tax that raises
labor costs in both industries by a proportionately equal amount. In
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comparison with the case of workers© self-insurance, this increase in
labor costs is offset to some degree by the disappearance of the risk
premium on earnings in the unstable industry, while there is no offset
in the other industry. The stable sector is made to bear some of the
costs of the fluctuations in the unstable sector. Consequently, the latter
expands relative to the former, and the average instability in the econ
omy increases.
Public insurance with a uniform payroll tax may generate the same
two moral hazard problems as private insurance. First, there is the pos
sibility that, while unemployed, workers postpone the acceptance of a
job offer because their cost of unemployment is very low or zero. Sec
ond, employers have no motivation to enhance employment smooth
ing: they cannot expect to pay lower wages by offering less job
volatility, since all workers currently have complete earnings stability.
As in the case of private insurance, both types of moral hazard may be
partially avoided by raising worker participation in the insurance.
Continuing our numerical illustrations, a new long-run equilibrium
might now have the following characteristics. Let the disposable
incomes in both industries be $24,000, of which, in the unstable indus
try, $1,125 consists of UI benefits. There is a 2.4 percent uniform pay
roll tax, which amounts to $576 per employee in the stable industry
and $549 [= 0.024($24,000 - $1,125)] per employee in the unstable
industry. Hence, the annual marginal cost of an employee is $24,576
(that is, $24,000 + $576) in the stable industry and $23,424 (that is,
$24,000 - $1,125 + $549) in the unstable industry. Any administrative
cost of the system would raise the payroll tax, but this would not affect
the main arguments concerning the effects of a uniform UI tax. As
compared with self-insurance by employees, the relative marginal cost
of labor falls in the unstable industry and rises in the stable industry;
this tends to lead to an expansion of the unstable industry and a con
traction of the stable industry.
Public Insurance with an Experience-Rated Payroll Tax
We now allow for an experience-rated UI tax. It differs from the uni
form tax in that employers© tax rates are linked to the claims experi
ence of their own employees.
A concept that may be useful in the following discussion is the
degree of experience rating. This measure ranges from zero to full, and
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then to complete. A zero degree of experience rating corresponds to a
uniform tax, which has already been discussed. Complete experience
rating is defined as the immediate and total payment by employers of
their employees© UI claims. 1 We define an intermediate degree of expe
rience rating as full experience rating. This exists when each employer
is assigned a tax rate appropriate to his/her risk class. A specific risk
class consists of employers with similar claims experiences, so that
their tax liabilities, when averaged over a sufficiently long period of
time, are the same. In the short run, any one employer may have a defi
cit or a surplus with the other members of the risk class, but, in the long
run, all employers pay fully for the UI claims of their own employees.
Two important implications of a public UI system with experience
rating are worth emphasizing. First, when there is some degree of
experience rating, but it is not complete, this type of UI plan provides
insurance to employers as well as to employees. Unemployment bene
fits serve to smooth employees© income streams, and the experiencerated tax structure tends to generate an even tax flow for employers. It
thus serves to smooth also the employers© cash flows.
Second, there is no direct link between the degree of experience rat
ing in the employer tax structure and the amount of income smoothing
provided to qualified unemployed workers. Complete employee
income smoothing may coexist with no experience rating or with com
plete experience rating. The degree of experience rating affects only
the amount and timing of the employer©s tax flows. In this respect, an
experience-rated public UI system is crucially different from a typical
private insurance program. Under private systems, complete experi
ence rating is tantamount to self-insurance by employees, while, under
public systems, it leads to self-insurance by employers only, with no
impact on employee insurance. Indeed, complete experience rating
may be viewed as a mechanism through which employers provide UI
to their own employees at the price of reduced average earnings. If
employers are less risk averse than employees, such an arrangement is
clearly beneficial to both parties.
Consider again our two-industry example, and suppose that the UI
tax is fully experience rated so that employers in the unstable industry
pay wholly for the cost of the unemployment benefits over an appropri
ate period of time. Further, in our illustration, employers in the stable
industry pay no UI taxes because their employees never draw unem-
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ployment benefits. As in the case of the uniform tax previously dis
cussed, employees in the unstable industry are assumed to receive a
constant flow of disposable income at the same annual rate as employ
ees in the stable industry.
Thus, employees in the unstable industry, when on layoff, receive
their full disposable income in the form of unemployment benefits.
There is no need for any residual self-insurance by these employees,
and the expected annual disposable incomes are the same in both
industries. The employers in this industry must now pay, as part of
their labor costs, for the unemployment benefits received by their
employees plus any administrative costs of the insurance. Full experi
ence rating ensures that UI does not lead to a significant change in the
relative marginal costs of labor in the two industries. As with selfinsurance and private insurance, but in contrast to public insurance
with a uniform tax, there is no incentive to expand the unstable sector
at the expense of the stable sector.
As far as the moral hazard, there is an important difference between,
on the one hand, private insurance and public insurance with a uniform
tax and, on the other hand, public insurance with an experience-rated
tax. This distinction arises from employer incentives to control layoffs.
Under an experience-rated tax, employers receive a direct reward, via
reduced taxes, for marginally reducing their layoffs. No such direct
marginal reward exists under private insurance or public insurance
with a uniform tax. Experience rating serves to remove, at least par
tially, some of the inherent UI inefficiencies due to moral hazard. The
other cause of moral hazard, the incentive for the jobless to reject alter
native employment offers, remains unaffected.2
A numerical example may again be helpful. Suppose that the dis
posable income in both industries is $25,200. In the stable industry,
this consists entirely of earnings, while in the unstable industry, dispos
able income consists of $22,500 received as earnings from employers
plus $2,700 in unemployment benefits. With full experience rating,
employers in the unstable industry are subject to an average payroll tax
of 12 percent, which is just adequate to raise the $2,700 for the benefits
paid to employees. Any costs of administering the system would
increase the payroll tax.
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The Case for Experience Rating
A comparison of a public UI system with no experience rating (i.e.,
a uniform tax) with one that is fully experience rated yields two key
conclusions. First, unless all employers in the system belong to the
same risk class, a uniform tax will lead to a distortion of relative prices
and thus the cross-subsidization of unstable by stable activities. As a
result, unstable activities are encouraged, and stable ones are discour
aged. Full experience rating avoids these problems and generates an
allocation of resources similar to that of well-functioning markets.
Less-than-full experience rating leads to cross-subsidization.
Joseph Becker (1972, 1981) emphasized the distortion of relative
prices and the consequent cross-subsidization in the UI system when
there is less-than-full experience rating. He referred to these problems
as inappropriate "cost accounting." Further, his empirical investiga
tions showed that construction firms tended to be heavily subsidized by
other businesses, especially those in finance, the services, and trade. In
the long run, this situation must be expected to lead to relatively low
output prices, relatively high real wages, and relative overproduction in
the subsidized sectors as compared to the operation of perfect markets.
For further analysis, see Adams (1986).
Subsequent empirical work has confirmed Becker©s original
research finding of substantial cross-subsidization among firms and
industries. The most recent microeconomic empirical analyses of
cross-subsidization have been presented in Laurence (1993) and
Anderson and Meyer (1994). An attempt at estimating the impact of
the cross-subsidization upon relative employment levels was under
taken by Deere (1991), who concluded that "a 10% increase in the
implicit subsidy to a layoff increases the employment share in con
struction by about 1.7% and decreases the employment share in ser
vices by almost 1%."
The second basic difference between a uniform and an experiencerated UI tax relates to the incentives for employers to control layoffs by
changing employment practices. Many theoretical aspects of the incen
tive effects of experience rating have been treated in the literature. Two
well-known articles are the ones by Feldstein (1976) and Baily (1978).
In addition, Brechling (1977) has presented a model of the incentive
effects in the institutional framework of the most common U.S. method
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of experience rating (that is, the reserve ratio method). This line of
research has been continued by Wolcowitz (1984) and Cook (1992).
Briefly, the argument states that since experience rating implies a
marginal tax cost for layoffs, a cost-minimizing employer will attempt
to adjust layoff practices in response to increases in the degree of expe
rience rating, so as to reduce the level of layoffs, benefit payments,
and, hence, employer taxes. The incentive is optimized when there is
full experience rating because this would lead to the same level of lay
offs that would be generated in perfectly working commodity, capital,
and labor markets. This result is especially clear in the Feldstein (1976)
model.

The Case against Experience Rating
We are aware of two kinds of counterarguments to the case for expe
rience rating. Since these criticisms have usually been made in com
ments on papers or in conversation, it is difficult to credit them to
particular individuals. Hence, they are presented here without attribu
tion.
1. It is often argued that individual employers do not react to experi
ence rating by altering their layoff patterns. There are two versions of
this position. First, the shifting of the tax removes any incentive for
firms to control their layoffs, and, second, even with an appropriate
incentive, employers are unable to control layoffs. Let us consider
these two versions in turn.
The first line of reasoning is that since the burden of the UI tax is
likely to be shifted forward via changes in output prices or backward
via changes in wages, it cannot have any incentive effects; thus, experi
ence rating cannot be effective in reducing layoffs. This argument is
based on the implicit assumption that tax shifting takes place instanta
neously, automatically, and at the level of the individual employer.
Suppose, for example, that an employer is considering a change in
maternity leave policy that, ceteris paribus, would reduce taxes by $X
and have a marginal cost of $K If the employer would invariably have
to pass on the entire net marginal surplus of $(X - Y) to workers in the
form of increased wages (and/or to customers in the form of reduced
output prices), then the marginal return to the employer would always
be zero. Here, tax shifting has been defined in such a narrow fashion
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that the employer has no inducement to introduce new technology,
because any net benefit in the form of higher profits is immediately
passed on to others. Thus, there cannot be a profit motive, as econo
mists normally understand that concept.
This narrow view of tax shifting is not supported in the relevant pub
lic finance literature. The approach is also incompatible with competi
tive theory in which prices and wages are determined by market
demand and supply and cannot be influenced by the actions of an indi
vidual employer.
In contrast to the narrow view of tax shifting, it seems reasonable to
assume, as we have done in the illustrative two-industry model, that
some industry average of the UI tax is shifted forward or backward and
that the behavior of any one employer does not affect the average tax
significantly. In this case, individual employers correctly treat their
output prices and wages (or compensation packages) as independent of
their own attempts to reduce their tax bills; employers can reap,
through higher profits, the full net benefits of any changes in layoff pat
terns that accrue to them through experience rating.
The second version of the argument is based on the assumption that,
because employers cannot change their layoff and employment pat
terns, they have very limited ability to respond to the incentives of
experience rating. Hence, experience rating may be unfair for employ
ers who operate in markets with particularly uncertain and volatile con
ditions.
In our view, the level of incentives of the tax system and degree to
which employers can and do respond to these incentives must be deter
mined primarily by empirical investigation, not by theoretical argu
ment. In a very general empirical framework, it is well known that
Japanese employment practices lead to substantially lower layoff rates
(and unemployment levels) than are customary in the U.S., yet Japa
nese firms have been well able to compete successfully in international
markets. Hence, it would appear that there are some opportunities for
U.S. employers to change their layoff patterns. Furthermore, empirical
work in the U.S. institutional framework has shown repeatedly that
employers do react to high marginal tax costs of layoffs by reducing
layoffs. The initial findings by Feldstein (1978), Brechling (1981),
Clark and Summers (1982), and Topel (1983) have been supplemented
recently by the research of Card and Levine (1994) and Anderson and
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Meyer (1994). We, therefore, reject the assertion that, in general,
employers cannot control their layoff patterns under an experiencerated UI tax structure.
2. It is sometimes argued that experience rating violates the basic
principles of insurance and that it should be incomplete or even be
replaced by a uniform tax. Our discussion earlier in this section has
shown that full experience rating is quite compatible with accepted
insurance principles. With experience rating, both employers and
employees can be provided with some insurance. Even if experience
rating were complete, only employers would lose their coverage, while
employees would remain insured.

The Two Dominant Methods of Experience Rating
The UI system in the U.S. has been established under both federal
and state laws. The federal statutes lay down general guidelines, under
which the states have substantial leeway to fashion systems to suit their
own circumstances. Thus, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)
mandates that there be experience-rated payroll taxes, but the determi
nation of the exact method of experience rating is left to the individual
states. States have enacted various methods of experience rating and,
within the same methods, different parameter values. Two forms of
experience rating are used predominantly: 3 the reserve ratio method
(used in 32 states) and the benefit ratio method (used in 15 states).
Although these approaches have much in common, their differences
may have important implications for the economic incentives they give
to employers to alter employment patterns. First, we will review the
common characteristics of these approaches.

Common Features of the Two Experience-Rating Methods
The two experience-rating methods share five features. These ele
ments are (1) the computation of the taxable payroll, (2) the concept of
charged benefits, (3) time lags, (4) the suspension of experience rating
under certain circumstances, and (5) trust fund solvency provisions.
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The Taxable Payroll
The firm©s UI tax bill (T) for a particular calendar year is the product
of its tax rate (x) and its taxable payroll (W) for that year. The taxable
payroll, in turn, consists of the cumulated earnings of all employees up
to the taxable wage base ( w ) for each employee in each calendar year.
On January 1, the process of cumulating earnings starts over again. The
minimum taxable wage base is set by FUTA, but higher bases may be
mandated by state legislatures. In 1994, the federal taxable wage base
was $7,000 and the state bases ranged up to $25,000.
Throughout this book, we assume that the taxable payroll per
employee is equal to the taxable wage base and that the employer©s
total taxable payroll is the product of the taxable wage base and the
mean of the employment levels at the beginning and the end of the
year.
Thus, if the taxable wage base is $10,000 and the employer©s work
force falls from 500 at the beginning of the calendar year to 400 at the
end of the year, the taxable payroll is assumed to be ($10,000) (1/2)
(500 + 400) = $4,500,000.
The preceding approximation of the taxable payroll may be dis
torted for two reasons. First, employment growth may not be smooth
between January 1 and December 31, so that the average employment
in the example may not be 450. Second, even if the level of employ
ment does not change during the year, interfirm labor turnover tends to
influence the size of the taxable payroll. Suppose, for example, that the
taxable wage base is $10,000 and that the annual wage paid in a partic
ular job is $20,000. If the job is filled by one employee for the entire
year, then the taxable payroll with respect to this position is $10,000.
If, on the other hand, the same job is filled by one employee in the first
six months and by a different employee during the second six months,
then the taxable payroll is $20,000 because the employer has to cumu
late earnings up to $10,000 for each employee. See Brechling (1977)
for a general formulation and elaboration of these points and Brechling
(1981) for an empirical verification.
Our approximation of the taxable payroll may be stated in equation
form:
(2.1)

Wt = fcj (#, + #,_!>,
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where Nt represents employment at year-end and Nt_i represents
employment at the beginning of year t. In general, the subscript t refers
to a calendar year. The equation relates to the formal analysis that will
be developed in later chapters.
Charged Benefits
An employer©s unemployment experience is measured by his/her
charged benefits (CB) under both the reserve and the benefit ratio
methods of experience rating. Charged benefits are the total annual
unemployment benefits that have been paid to the employer©s laid-off
workers and that have been deemed to be chargeable to the employer©s
account. Not all unemployment benefits are chargeable. Examples of
noncharged benefits are benefits paid to voluntary quitters, some
"extended" benefits legislated specifically in particularly severe reces
sions, and some benefits paid for employee dependents.
Charged benefits arise from both temporary and permanent layoffs.
Temporary layoffs are those leading only to relatively short-lived
reductions in employment. These cutbacks are reversed by new hires or
recalls after fairly brief periods of time. From the perspective of our
current discussion, as introduced in chapter 1, the most important char
acteristic of temporary layoffs is that they do not lead to significant
long-run reductions in the taxable payroll. Permanent layoffs, by con
trast, are defined as lasting curtailments in the work force and do imply
a decrease in the taxable payroll.
It should perhaps be pointed out that the distinction between tempo
rary and permanent layoffs need not necessarily correspond to the
unemployment experiences of individual workers. As an example, sup
pose that worker A is laid off and that worker B is hired as a replace
ment after a short time. If A remains unemployed for a long period,
then the layoff is regarded as temporary by the employer but as perma
nent by the employee. In this study, layoffs are categorized as tempo
rary or permanent according to the employer©s perception. To be sure,
since the rate of recall is typically very high among temporary layoffs,
the latter are likely to be perceived as temporary by both the employer
and by most of the affected employees.
Our subsequent analysis is facilitated by specifying a temporary lay
off rate (w), which measures the proportion of the average stock of
employees laid off in a calendar year. Thus, if the layoff rate is 10 per-
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cent and the average level of employment is 450 (as in the preceding
example), then the hypothetical employer effects 45 temporary layoffs
in the calendar year. Permanent layoffs are measured by the net reduc
tion in the level of employment over the course of the calendar year. In
the example, permanent layoffs amount to 100 (i.e., 500 - 400). Per
manent layoffs are zero when the employer adds to employment over
the course of the year.
Both temporary and permanent layoffs qualify for unemployment
benefits. The weekly benefit payment (b) is determined by state law,
usually at about one-half of previous earnings, subject to a maximum.
We shall use the concept of benefits per unemployment spell (b). This
is simply the product of the weekly benefit payment and the number of
weeks that the laid-off worker receives unemployment compensation.
Thus, if the weekly benefit payment is $250 and the duration of the
unemployment spell is 12 weeks, the benefit per unemployment spell is
(12) ($250) = $3,000. This would be the amount of benefits charged to
the employer©s account with respect to each layoff. In practice, the
weekly benefit payment and the unemployment duration are likely to
differ among employees. Hence, the $3,000 should be considered as an
average for all layoffs.
The level of charged benefits can be expressed as the following
equation:
(2.2)
where
and

CBt = b[ut (Nt _ l+ Nt) + (#,_!-#

(Nt_} - Nt) = (Nt_} - Nt) if (fy_7 - Nt) > 0
(Nt_j - Nt) = 0 if (Nt_} - Nt) < 0.

The first term in the square brackets in equation (2.2) represents
temporary layoffs, and the second term represents permanent layoffs.
Time Lags
With both types of experience rating, there are substantial periods of
time between the year when unemployment benefits are paid and
charged to an employer and the year when the tax rate changes. Typi
cally, the employer tax rate for 1994, for example, would have been
determined between June and October of 1993, based on the layoff
experience over the years 1990, 1991, and 1992. These time lags pre-
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vent the immediate response of taxes to charged benefits and may
cause inequality between a firm©s charged benefits and its tax payments
in any particular year. Furthermore, neither method allows for interest
payments or discounting. Thus, even if the firm pays $100 in taxes for
each $100 of charged benefits, the lag of the former behind the latter
implies that, in present value terms, tax payments fall short of charged
benefits.
Suspension of Experience Rating
Experience rating is partially or fully suspended in certain circum
stances under both the reserve ratio and the benefit ratio methods. In
particular, minimum and maximum tax rates (TMIN and TMAX) are speci
fied by state laws. Changes in charged benefits do not affect these min
imum or maximum tax rates, and, as long as an employer is and
expects to remain at the minimum or maximum tax rate, changes in
charged benefits cannot affect his/her tax bill. The minimum tax rate
ensures that all employers make a minimal contribution to the UI sys
tem. It is usually regarded as necessary to pay for the noncharged ben
efits that are not attributable to any particular employer. The maximum
rate alleviates the tax burden for employers with particularly high past
unemployment experiences. At the maximum and minimum rates, ben
efits are said to be ineffectively charged because they are not allowed to
influence employers© individual tax rates.
Experience rating is also absent for new employers since they have
no history of layoffs. Typically, they are assigned an initial fixed tax
rate until they acquire the necessary unemployment experience. 4 In
some states, this tax rate varies according to the unemployment experi
ence of the industry in which the new employer is located.
Another suspension of experience rating occurs in the case of bank
rupt or inactive employers. The costs of unemployment benefits paid to
these employers© laid-off workers may be charged to the employers©
accounts, but since they have ceased to operate, their payrolls and tax
liabilities are zero, no matter what their accumulated charged benefits
may be.
Trust Fund Solvency
If all unemployment benefits were fully charged and there were no
time lags or suspensions in the experience-rating methods, the current
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tax payments of all employers would be adequate to pay for all current
unemployment benefits. If, in addition, a small tax were levied to
recover administration costs, then the UI system would be totally selffinanced in any particular year. Since the required conditions are not
satisfied, however, the UI system may run an annual deficit or surplus.
To allow for the carry-over of deficit or surplus balances from one year
to another, state trust funds have been established. Employer tax
payments (as well as interest and some other disbursements from the
federal government) are credited to the state©s trust fund, and
unemployment benefit payments are debited.
To ensure the long-run solvency of their trust funds, all states have
made provisions for some or all tax rates to rise (fall) as the trust fund
balance, expressed as a percentage of the state©s total taxable payroll,
falls (rises).5 These changes in tax schedules are automatic and do not
require specific legislation. States differ in the methods by which their
tax structures respond to changes in the trust fund balance. In Louisi
ana, for example, a falling trust fund balance triggers equiproportionate
increases in experience-rated tax rates. Thus, with given taxable pay
rolls, employers with high UI tax rates face larger increases in their tax
bills than do employers with low tax rates. In Mississippi, by contrast,
a fixed absolute amount is added to all UI tax rates, thus distributing
the tax burden equally across employers. As a third illustration, Minne
sota raises just the minimum tax rate (TMIN), thus only raising the tax
burden of employers with the best experience record. Though the dis
tribution of the extra tax burden may differ among states, all states
have made provisions for aggregate tax inflows to increase as the trust
fund declines or, indeed, becomes negative.
In general, state laws governing employer experience rating may be
regarded as allocating UI costs to individual employers. Laws govern
ing changes in average tax rates are designed to ensure the solvency of
the system as a whole.
While the reserve ratio and the benefit ratio methods of experience
rating may be viewed from the perspective of their common dimen
sions, these two approaches differ in several important respects. We
now turn to a description of their unique characteristics.
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Distinctive Features of the Two Experience-Rating Methods
The Reserve Ratio Method
Under the reserve ratio method of experience rating, each employer
is assigned an account similar to an ordinary checking account. The
account contains the employer©s past tax payments as deposits and past
charged benefits as debits. During any particular year, the balance in
this account rises by the amount of tax payments and falls by the
amount of charged benefits. At the end of a year t, the balance (Bt),
which may be negative, is thus equal to all past tax payments minus all
past charged benefits. As noted before, according to current laws, the
employer neither receives interest on positive balances nor pays inter
est on negative balances.
The employer©s reserve ratio (RR) is defined as the ratio of the bal
ance to the taxable payroll, where the latter is usually averaged over the
past three-to-five calendar years. The reserve ratio is usually expressed
as a percentage. As an example, assume that the hypothetical employer
had the following taxable payrolls:
1990 $4,500,000
1991 $4,700,000
1992 _ $4,800,000
With a balance at the end of 1992 of $200,000, the employer©s reserve
ratio at the end of 1992 would have been:
200, 000

RR92 = 100

L . | I (4| 500, 000 + 4, 700, 000 + 4, 800,000)

= 100(.0429) = 4.29%.
The essence of the reserve ratio method of experience rating is the
negative link between the reserve ratio and the tax rate. Figure 2.1
illustrates a typical tax schedule.6 The tax rate for year t is measured
along the vertical axis, and the lagged reserve ratio is shown along the
horizontal axis. The schedule is kinked at RR below which TMAX
applies, and at RR above which TMIN applies. As previously mentioned,
the tax rate responds to changes in the reserve ratio with a substantial
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lag. Typically, the firm©s tax rate for year t is determined in the JuneOctober period of year (t - 1) on the basis of the firm©s reserve ratio at
the end of year (t - 2).7 The tax schedule in figure 2.1 is valid only for a
particular range of values of the state trust fund balance. Higher sched
ules apply for lower trust fund balances (expressed as a percentage of
the statewide taxable payroll), and vice versa. In the tax codes of
reserve ratio states, the various schedules are usually presented in tabu
lar form.
Figure 2.1

Reserve Ratio Tax Schedule

0

RR

RR

Reserve Ratio
(RR,- 2)

The reserve ratio (4.29 percent for the end of 1992 or later in some
states) can be located on the horizontal axis in figure 2.1. The corre
sponding tax rate (for 1994, in the example) can then be read off the
vertical axis.
We now state the main characteristics of the reserve ratio method in
formal terms. The employer©s balance B at the end of year t is defined
as:
(2.3)
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where m is the total number of years for which the employer has had an
account and i is a counter from 0 to m. As before, the time subscript t
dates stocks (such as the balance B) at the end of the year and flows
(such as tax payments 7) during the year. The reserve ratio RR is
defined as the ratio of the firm©s balance to a moving average of its tax
able payroll W:
(2.4)

RRt = (n+1) n

©

,

where (n+1) is the number of years over which the moving average of
the taxable payroll is calculated. Typically (n+1) is three-to-five years.
As discussed, the essential element of the reserve ratio method of
experience rating is that the tax rate T and the reserve ratio RR are neg
atively related:

(2.5)

T, = a-s(x ltRR + %2t RRt _ 2 + X3t RR) ,

where a is the intercept of the tax schedule, which must be positive,
and s is the slope of the tax schedule, which should lie between 0 and
1. Typically, a is in the range of 5 to 8 percent and s is in the range of
0.25 to 0.50. As previously mentioned, there are minimum and maxi
mum tax rates (TMAX and TMIN) mat are triggered at critically low (RR}
and high (RR) reserve ratios. The Xs are dummy variables that repre
sent the three ranges of the tax schedule. Specifically,
1. When RRt_2 < RR then (xltt X2tt ^ = (1,0, 0)
and Tt = TMAX = a - sRR; the firm is at the maximum tax rate.
2. When RR < RRt_2 < RR then (%lt, %2t, ;&,) = (0, 1, 0)
and T, = TSLOPE = a ~ sRRt-2-> me ^Tm *s on me experience-rated
segment of the tax schedule.
3. When RR < RRt_2 ther^,, X2t, *3,) = (0, 0, 1)
and T, = TMIN = a - sRR; the firm is at the minimum tax rate.
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The Benefit Ratio Method
Under the benefit ratio method of experience rating, the firm©s tax
rate is related positively to its benefit ratio BR. The benefit ratio is
defined as the ratio of a moving average of charged benefits CBt to a
moving average of the taxable payroll Wt. Usually the averages are
computed over three to five calendar years. Thus, in the example of the
previous section, the hypothetical employer©s average taxable payroll
for the years 1990, 1991, and 1992 was $4,666,667. With an average
annual level of charged benefits of $140,000 over the same three years,
the benefit ratio for this period would be 140,000/4,666,667 = 3 per
cent. For the sake of brevity, we shall refer to it as the 1992 benefit
ratio (BR92).
The benefit ratio method of experience rating is based on a positive
relationship between the tax rate in year t, which is 1994, in the present
example, and the benefit ratio in year (t - 2), which is 1992 in the
present example. The tax schedule is illustrated in figure 2.2. It shows
that TMIN applies when the benefit ratio is below BR. varies positively
with the benefit ratio along the sloped part of the schedule, and is fixed
at TMAX when the benefit ratio is above BR. As in the case of the reserve
ratio method, the tax schedule in figure 2.2 moves up and down auto
matically when the state©s trust fund balance (as a percentage of the
statewide taxable payroll) falls or rises. Given a 1992 benefit ratio, the
corresponding tax rate for 1994 can be read from the vertical axis of
the figure.
More formally, the benefit ratio for an employer is defined as

(2.6)
1=0

where, similar to the case of the reserve ratio method (n+l) is the num
ber of calendar years, over which CB and W are averaged. The com
plete tax schedule can be expressed as
(2.7)

T, = c + k (i ltBR + %2tBRt _ 2 + %3r (BR) )
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where c is the intercept and k is the slope of the tax schedule. In prac
tice, c and k are often close to zero and unity, respectively. The vector
of dummy variables (%it, %it, Xifot) ensures that the tax schedule con
sists of three segments, with the following values:

1. When BRt_2 < BR , then (%lt, X2p Xit) = (1, 0, 0)
and T, = TMIN = c + kBR: the firm is at the minimum tax rate.
2. When BR < BRt_2 < BR©, then Cfr f, X2t, X3t) = (0, 1, 0)
and Tt = TSLOPE = c + kBRt_2, the firm is on the experience-rated
segment of the tax schedule.
3. When BR < BRt_2 then_(^lr, X2t, #3/) = (0, 0, 1)
and T, = TMAX = c + kBR, ; the firm is at the maximum tax rate.
Figure 2.2 Benefit Ratio Tax Schedule
Tax rate

BR

BR

Benefit Ratio

Basic Differences of the Two Methods
In evaluating the essential differences between the reserve and bene
fit ratio methods of experience rating, we first consider the information
contained in these measures. The reserve ratio is a summary record of
all the employer©s past tax payments and charged benefits. It is a com
prehensive indicator of the relevant relationships with the UI system.
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By contrast, the benefit ratio measures only the charged benefits over
the (n + 1) years. Under the reserve ratio method, employers© tax rates
are determined by their entire tax and benefit history; under the benefit
ratio method, the tax is simply the delayed payment for charged bene
fits.
Second, since the reserve ratio is a summary of all past benefit and
tax payments, this method has a very long memory. With typical
parameters, benefits charged 15 years ago may have an influence on
the current tax rate. The benefit ratio method, on the other hand, forgets
any benefits that were charged prior to (n + 3), for example, five years
ago. This point is particularly relevant in a recession, when employers
are pushed temporarily to the maximum tax rate, where experience rat
ing is suspended and further benefits are said to be charged ineffec
tively. Under the benefit ratio method, part or all of these charged
benefits will be forgotten; under the reserve ratio method, these bene
fits will be remembered through the falling reserve ratio, which will
cause increased taxes when economic circumstances improve. In other
words, benefits are likely to be ineffectively charged permanently
under the benefit ratio method and ineffectively charged temporarily
under the reserve ratio method.
Third, the reserve ratio method incorporates the concept of a precau
tionary financial balance, which can be used for temporary deficits. In
the course of a typical business cycle, the employer©s fund is built up in
economic good times and drawn down in bad times. The employer©s
cyclically fluctuating benefit flow is matched by a fairly smooth tax
flow; as a result, the employer has a surplus with the system in booms
and a deficit in recessions. The design provides insurance to the
employer in accordance with principles described earlier in this chap
ter. In the absence of business cycles, i.e., when benefit flows are
smooth, the reserve ratio method generates a long-run (steady-state)
balance and reserve ratio. By contrast, the benefit ratio method is sim
ply a "pay-as-you-go" system, in which payment occurs with a lag. It
does not incorporate explicitly the concept of a precautionary balance
that can support temporary deficits.
Fourth, the relationship between charged benefits and taxes is more
complex and has longer lags under the reserve than under the benefit
ratio method. As an illustration, suppose that the tax rate remains at
less than the maximum. Under the reserve ratio method, an increase in
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charged benefits of $100 will reduce, ceteris paribus, the balance by
$100. This reduction, in turn, will raise taxes after two years by less
than $100 (with typical parameter values) but maintain increased taxes
for many years until the entire $100 is paid. Under the benefit ratio
method, the $100 in benefits would be paid by increased taxes in years
3, 4, and 5.
The Degree of Experience Rating
We have defined the degree of experience rating in terms of the
closeness of the link between charged benefits and the resulting taxes.
We will now develop this concept further by specific reference to the
two methods of experience rating.
A zero degree of experience rating is achieved under either method
when the payroll tax is independent of charged benefits. This would be
reflected by a zero slope of the tax schedules in figures 2.1 and 2.2.
The degree of experience rating incorporated in the system would
increase as a result of the following parameter changes. First, if the
maximum tax rate TMAX is raised and/or the minimum tax rate TMIN is
lowered, then the ranges over which the reserve and benefit ratios are
on the sloped parts of the tax schedule increase; thus, the employer is
more likely to be experience rated.
Second, the closer the slope of the tax schedule is to unity, the closer
is the numerical response of the tax to charged benefits. Therefore, the
degree of experience rating is higher.
Third, the shorter the time period between the disbursement of bene
fits and the payment of taxes, the fewer interest-free loans are made.
Consequently, the degree of experience rating is greater.
Fourth, given that there are some irreducible time lags between ben
efit disbursements, the degree of experience rating can also be raised
by appropriate interest charges and credits, so that interest-free loans
are precluded. This could be done very easily under the reserve ratio
method by paying interest on positive employer fund balances and by
charging interest on negative balances.
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Experience Rating and Temporary Layoffs
The relationship between temporary layoffs and an experience-rated
UI tax was examined in the previously mentioned papers by Feldstein
(1976) and Baily (1977). Their characterization of experience rating
was very general, however. As an example, Feldstein simply used the
parameter e (which ranges from zero to one) to describe the degree of
experience rating. Brechling (1977) used a model of the reserve ratio
method of experience rating (without maximum and minimum tax
rates) and studied the impact on the incentive to lay off workers. Wolcowitz (1984) extended this work by allowing for maximum and mini
mum tax rates and by elaborating on the full, dynamic implications of
the reserve ratio method. Cook (1992) furthered the analysis by consid
ering the benefit ratio as well as the reserve ratio method of experience
rating.
The cited literature is based on a model of the individual firm. The
firm can vary temporary layoffs from which it derives some net mar
ginal benefit. In the absence of an experience-rated UI system, optimal
layoffs are determined at the point where their net marginal benefits are
zero. A constant payroll tax indicates a zero marginal tax cost of lay
offs and consequently a relatively high level of layoffs. In contrast,
both methods of experience rating may imply positive marginal tax
costs of layoffs, thereby giving incentives to employers to reduce lay
offs below the level generated by zero net marginal benefits.
In her detailed analysis of the two methods of experience rating,
Cook (1992) reaches the following general conclusions. First, the
reserve ratio and benefit ratio methods are quite different in their
dynamic implications. The reserve ratio method gives rise to dynamic
decision rules, which require that the firm adopt optimal paths of lay
offs crucially dependent on the initial and final reserve ratios. Changes
in exogenous factors tend to affect the entire optimal path of layoffs.
By contrast, the benefit ratio method results in static decision rules,
which require, with unchanged exogenous factors, a constant optimal
layoff rate, independent of its future or past levels. Changes in exoge
nous factors lead to instantaneous adjustment in the optimal layoff
rate.
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Second, when a typical firm starts and expects to remain on the hor
izontal sections of the tax schedules, that is, at TMAX or TMIN» then,
under both methods of experience rating, the marginal tax cost of lay
offs is zero, and the layoff rate is the same as under a tax not based on
experience rating. In these cases, there is no difference between the
two methods of experience rating because neither is operative.
Third, when a hypothetical firm is and expects to remain on the
sloped segment of the tax schedule, then both methods of experience
rating yield positive marginal tax costs of layoffs and lead to optimal
layoffs below those generated by a system without experience rating.
Further, the higher the slope of the tax schedule (s or k) and the lower
the rate of discount (that is, the interest rate), the higher the marginal
tax costs will be and the lower the optimal layoff rate. With realistic
parameter settings, the implied marginal tax costs are quite similar
under the two methods of experience rating. There are no inherent
characteristics of the two methods that give rise to differences in layoff
behavior when the firm starts and remains on the slope of the tax
schedule.
Fourth, when, due to some exogenous change, the firm starts on one
segment of the tax schedule and ends up on another, the two methods
lead to different behavior. The reserve ratio method adjusts layoffs
gradually from the old to the new level, while the benefit ratio adjusts
layoffs instantaneously to the new equilibrium level. Thus, when the
firm moves from the sloped to the flat segments of the tax schedule, the
reserve ratio method leads to lower average layoff rates than the benefit
ratio method. On the other hand, when the firm moves from the flat to
the sloped segments of the tax schedules, the benefit ratio method leads
to lower average layoff rates than the reserve ratio method.
As previously discussed, the results of empirical work over the past
15 years or so seem to lend substantial support to the theoretical claim
that the degree of experience rating has a significant negative impact on
the level of temporary layoffs and on unemployment. In the work by
Topel (1983), Card and Levine (1994), and Anderson and Meyer
(1994), the characteristics of the two experience-rating methods are
embodied in the estimates of the "marginal tax costs" (MTC) of lay
offs. Hence, any essential differences between the two methods of
experience rating should be reflected in differences in their MTCs.
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Concluding Remarks
We have attempted to set the stage for the analysis to be presented in
the following chapters. The primary concern of previous investigators
of experience rating has been its impact on temporary layoffs. Unem
ployment benefits for temporary layoffs are often justified in terms of
insurance principles. Insurance serves to maintain disposable incomes
of employees during temporary layoffs, and employees pay for this
service via reduced average earnings.
In the U.S. system, employers are directly responsible for the pay
ment of UI taxes. This gives rise to a possible additional insurance
attribute, the smoothing of the typical employer©s cash flows.
In customary private insurance arrangements (e.g., automobile
insurance), experience rating is applied to the premiums paid by the
insurant. Experience rating in public UI situations, on the other hand,
refers to the experience of employers. When experience rating is full,
employers pay, over an appropriately long period of time, for all the
unemployment benefits received by their own former workers. When
experience rating is less than full, there exists (1) long-run cross-subsi
dization of one group of firms by another, which, in turn, leads to a
misallocation of resources, and (2) a possibly substantial moral hazard
problem, which implies nonoptimally large layoffs. When experience
rating is complete, employers pay fully and immediately for all of their
former employees© benefits. Thus, employers lose their (cash flow
smoothing) insurance entirely, but employees are still insured.
Empirical investigations of UI taxes and benefits have shown that
there are sizable cross-subsidizations, so that, by and large, actual
experience-rating systems in the U.S. are less than full. Further, there is
now convincing evidence that increases in the degree of experience rat
ing reduce layoffs significantly. For these reasons, an increase in the
degree of UI experience rating for temporary layoffs is a desirable
social goal.
We have described the technical aspects of the two most common
experience-rated UI tax systems as well as their implications for tem
porary layoffs. The methods differ in their dynamic effects and in the
length of their memory. The degree of experience rating can be ele
vated by (1) raising the maximum tax rate, (2) lowering the minimum
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tax rate, (3) increasing the slope of the tax schedule, if it is below unity,
or (4) charging interest on outstanding benefits. We have a preference
for the reserve ratio method of experience rating because it has a longer
memory and can easily be amended to reflect the appropriate financial
cost by paying interest on employers© positive balances and by
charging interest on negative balances.
Against this background, we now turn to an examination of perma
nent layoffs. Three basic questions will be addressed. How important
are permanent as compared to temporary layoffs? How should the
costs of permanent layoffs be covered? How do the two most common
methods of experience rating treat the costs of permanent layoffs?
NOTES
1. Complete experience rating is actually approximated in the U.S. by the so-called reimburs
able method of experience rating, for which certain not-for-profit companies and local govern
ment agencies qualify. See also note 3.
2. In the preceding discussion, we have assumed, for the sake of expository ease, that workers
receive unemployment benefits equal to their previous earnings, that is, that the replacement ratio
is unity. In practice, replacement ratios are 40 to 60 percent; thus, there is a substantial amount of
self-insurance by employees. The more self-insurance there is, the less important are the moral
hazard problems associated with the three types of insurance systems.
3. The other two types of experience rating are the benefit wage ratio method, used in two
states, and the payroll decline method, used in one state. In addition, there is the reimbursable
method (mentioned in note 1), which may be chosen by qualifying nonprofit and government
employers in all states. The reimbursable method is not related to a payroll tax. Employers are
simply sent a bill for UI benefits paid to their employees.
4. The time period over which a new firm pays a tax not based on experience rating ranges
from one to four years.
5. Negative trust fund balances imply that the states must borrow from the federal govern
ment. States have to pay interest on these loans. Furthermore, the Secretary of Labor may impose
a special federal tax to recoup loans to state trust funds. Thus, states have definite incentives to
avoid negative trust fund balances.
6. Most actual tax schedules consist of small steps along the sloped part and of one or two
larger steps in the neighborhood of the zero reserve ratio.
7. In figure 2.1, the reserve ratio at the end of 1992 determines the tax rate in 1994. Some
states use a shorter lag between the reserve ratio and the tax rate. For instance, in New York State,
the reserve ratio for December 31, 1993, is computed as the ratio of the firm©s trust fund balance
on that date to the taxable payroll for the period of October 1, 1992 to September 30, 1993. The
tax rate for 1994 is then determined on the basis of the reserve ratio on December 31, 1993. The
longer lag, presented in the text, is used by most states.

3
Recent Trends in Permanent
and Temporary Layoffs
How important are temporary layoffs in comparison to permanent
layoffs? If declines in employment are for the most part temporary,
then the design of the unemployment insurance (UI) system should be
such that the firm creating the layoff pays for the benefits received by
workers. However, if much of the employment decline is permanent,
this pool of unemployed labor serves as a reserve available for growing
firms to hire (Hall 1971). The expanding enterprise gains from the per
manent layoff and thus may be assessed part of the associated UI cost.
Using unpublished data from the National Longitudinal Survey
(1966-1971) of work experience of men between the ages of 45 and 59,
Feldstein (1976) found that 61 percent of the unemployed were on
temporary layoff. Crosslin, Hanna, and Stevens, who used data from
the ES-202 Report and from the U.S. Department of Labor©s Continu
ous Wage and Benefit History program data base (1979-1983) for five
states, concurred with Feldstein©s results. Yet, Murphy and Topel
(1987), working with information from the Annual Demographic File
(1968-1985) of the Current Population Survey (CPS), found that, for
males between the ages of 18 and 64, permanent, not temporary, sepa
rations accounted for a larger fraction of the unemployment rate. This
relationship persisted over the study period as unemployment rose in
the downturn of the business cycle, except during 1975, when tempo
rary, rather than permanent, layoffs were a higher fraction of the unem
ployment rate.
Using firm and individual employment information from the UI
administrative records of six states, Anderson and Meyer (1994)
decomposed the fraction of employees receiving benefits into those on
temporary or on permanent layoff. They found that the proportion of
employees receiving UI benefits on permanent layoff ranged from 24
to 66 percent across the six states.
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The Data
Our study utilizes two longitudinal data sets for establishments from
the records of the Texas Employment Commission, which administers
the UI program in the state. The first set contains quarterly employ
ment statistics for 101,169 establishments, either with continuous
employment or declared bankruptcy, from the years 1978 to 1982. This
sample represents 60 percent of employment in the state. l The second
set comprises monthly employment data for 822,713 establishments
from 1978 to 1989. The establishments constitute all those in the state
with covered employment during the period. However, a maximum of
approximately 400,000 establishments were in operation in any quar
ter, such that a large number of births and deaths of establishments
occurred over this time span.
Each data set provides a different perspective on the issue of
employment reductions. The major strength of both sets is that they
enable the calculation of quarter-to-quarter (or month-to-month)
employment declines, unlike other sources that may have only annual
or decennial data.
Are employment reductions a fair indication of temporary or perma
nent layoffs? An employment reduction can occur due to one of four
reasons: a temporary layoff, a permanent layoff, a quit, or a retirement.
A quit or retirement can affect the number of both temporary and per
manent employment declines. If an employer maintains a job, then the
worker who quits or retires will be replaced. When the replacement
occurs prior to the worker©s departure, the calculation of respective
employment declines is unaffected. Otherwise, the quit or retirement
could be counted as either a temporary or a permanent employment
decline, depending on how long the position remains vacant. If the
employer cuts the number of job positions, then the quit or retirement
will be counted as a permanent employment decline.
The importance of retirements in the calculation is difficult to dis
cern. However, Murphy and Topel (1987) indicate that quits repre
sented 10 percent, on average, of the unemployment rate caused by
temporary layoffs, separations, and quits from 1968 to 1985. Hence,
employer-initiated spells are dominant in unemployment. As previ-
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ously stated, the proportion of permanent, as opposed to temporary,
layoffs during the period is consistently greater, except in 1975. 2
If quits were equally distributed between temporary and permanent
employment declines, the percentage calculation of employment
declines representing temporary and permanent layoffs would be unaf
fected. If quits were associated only with permanent declines, then per
manent layoffs would be overestimated by approximately 5 percent. 3
The overrepresentation of permanent layoffs would therefore range
between 0 and 5 percent in the calculations presented subsequently in
this chapter. How else might these measures be imperfect?
All reductions in employment may not result in UI benefit pay
ments, although certainly a proportion of these cutbacks would be
eligible.
If the individual is replaced within the time period over which the
employment reduction is assessed, then temporary reductions in
employment would tend to overestimate temporary layoffs.
The establishment record does not identify an employment change
caused by the sale of only part of the establishment. The employ
ment decline within the establishment would be counted as a per
manent decline, such that the calculation of permanent reductions
would be overestimated.
It is not possible to assess whether employment from one quarter
to the next (or from one month to the next) represents the same
jobs for the same employees. If this is not the case, permanent
declines in employment would yield an underestimate of perma
nent layoffs because some individuals would remain jobless
although their former positions had been filled.

Measurement of Employment Declines
For the measurement of employment declines, we focus on a rela
tively narrow definition of temporary layoffs. In the macroeconomic
literature, in contrast, temporary layoffs may involve longer periods,
such as a full business cycle. Our approach considers the fact that UI
creates a special relationship between workers and firms, one that can
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be temporarily broken for up to 26 weeks. For longer layoffs, however,
the relationship may be permanently severed as workers have no incen
tive to wait for recall.4 Note that 26 weeks is the typical time period for
which a worker can collect UI benefits and that the average unemploy
ment spell currently lasts about 15 weeks.
Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 represent the possible pattern of employ
ment changes for those firms with reductions in employment. 5 To esti
mate the amount of permanent and temporary employment reductions,
the comparisons use A, B, and C as three consecutive points in time. If
employment in period B is less than employment in period A, then
period C is used as a reference point to determine the status of the
employment decline as permanent or temporary. The following algo
rithm was used:
1. Figure 3.1:
If employment at C is less than or equal to employment at B, then
the change in employment from A to B is permanent.
2. Figure 3.2:
If employment at C is greater than that at B, but less than that at
A, then the change from A to C is permanent and from C to B is
temporary.
3. Figure 3.3:
If employment at C is greater than or equal to employment at A,
then the change from A to B is temporary.
All temporary and permanent employment reductions per establish
ment are summed up over the available quarters (or months). The data
are categorized as to whether the establishments are stable or growing,
contracting, or bankrupt; by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
code; and by size as measured by average employment.

Stable or Growing Establishments Versus Contracting or
Bankrupt Establishments
The first sample consisted of 101,169 establishments with 20 quar
ters of continuous employment and also bankrupt establishments. This
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Figure 3.1

Employment Changes: Permanent Change from A to B

Number of jobs
12

10

B
Time period

Figure 3.2 Employment Changes: Permanent Change from A to C
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Figure 3.3 Employment Changes: Temporary Change from A to B
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sample was used to categorize the establishments as (1) stable or grow
ing, (2) contracting, or (3) bankrupt. To determine whether establish
ments were stable or growing, or contracting, the log of quarterly
employment (20 observations) was regressed on a time trend and four
seasonal dummies (the constant was suppressed). If the coefficient on
the time trend was negative with a t statistic greater than one, the estab
lishment was categorized as having declining employment. If, on the
other hand, the coefficient on the time trend was zero or positive with a
t statistic greater than or less than one, or negative with a t statistic less
than one, the establishment was categorized as having stable or grow
ing employment.
Reductions in employment were calculated using three consecutive
quarters so that if employment declined between the first and second
quarters in question, the third quarter was used to assess whether the
reduction was permanent or temporary. The calculation continued for
each successive quarter (i.e., second quarter vis-a-vis the third and
fourth) and summed over 18 quarters. This three-quarter time period
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seems appropriate because UI benefits are available for only 26 weeks.
If an employer seeks to recall a layoff, it is logical for this to occur
prior to the exhaustion of benefits.
To ascertain the sensitivity of the analysis to the assumed time
period, the calculation was repeated using five quarters. Employment
in the first quarter was compared to that in the third. If employment
declined in this period, then the fifth quarter was used to determine
whether the decrease was permanent or temporary. Again, the employ
ment reductions were summed over the 16 available quarters.
Confirming the work of Murphy and Topel (1987), tables 3.1 and
3.2 provide summaries showing that (1) more than half of employment
reductions were permanent in the three categories of establishments
using both the three-quarter and five-quarter time horizons, and (2)
there is an increasing percentage of permanent employment reductions
as the unemployment rate rises. The results for stable or growing estab
lishments are somewhat sensitive to the choice of time horizon. There
exists a 14 percentage point difference in the three-quarter and fivequarter results as compared to a mere 3 percentage point difference in
the other two classifications. Regardless, the data reveal that permanent
employment reductions are consistently more important than tempo
rary reductions in all categories, particularly for contracting and bank
rupt establishments, as expected.
Table 3.1

Percentage of Permanent Employment Reductions by Type of
Establishment (Texas, 1978-1982)

Time horizon
3 quarters
5 quarters

Stable or growing
68
54

Establishments
Contracting
Percent
84
81
Number

Bankrupt
82
79

Establishments______70,146_______30,261________762____
SOURCE: Data sample for 1978-1982 from Texas Employment Commission.
NOTE: The percentage of permanent employment reductions is calculated as the number of per
manent employment reductions divided by total employment reductions times 100.
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Table 3.2 Permanent Employment Reductions and the Unemployment
Rate (Texas, 1978-1989)
Year
1981
1980
1979
U.S. unemployment rate
Texas unemployment rate
Percentage of permanent
employment reductions

5.8
4.2

7.1
5.2

7.6
5.3

69.7

70.8

72.7

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Texas Employment Commission.
NOTE: The percentage of permanent employment reductions is calculated as the number of per
manent employment reductions divided by total employment reductions times 100. Calculations
are based on the data sample used in table 3.1.

The Importance of Permanent Versus Temporary
Reductions by SIC and Size of Firm
Do employment reductions differ by industry classification or by
size of establishment? We analyzed the second set of data from the
Texas Employment Commission records to answer these questions.
Given the availability of monthly employment figures, six-month and
nine-month time horizons were utilized.
Some records of individual establishments contained zero monthly
employment numbers within periods of positive employment. It was
not known whether the zero job figures were caused by establishment
closings for those months or by nonreporting of employment to the
Commission. To overcome this problem, the analysis was carried out
using three separate methods:
1. The first method assumes that the zero employment numbers
were caused by establishment closings.
2. If, in the period over which the employment reduction is assessed,
the change in employment becomes positive again, method 2
ignores the zero employment figure, assuming it to have been due
to the nonreporting of data. If employment does not recover in the
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relevant time period, then a permanent decline in employment is
assumed to have occurred, caused by the establishment closing.
3. Method 3 removes from the analysis those firms with spells of
zero employment of duration shorter than the time period over
which the employment reduction is assessed.
For both methods 2 and 3 assume that a brief zero employment spell
is likely to reflect a reporting error, whereas a lengthy spell is most
likely attributable to an actual establishment closing.
All three methods were analyzed using a six-month horizon.
Method 2 was also analyzed using a nine-month horizon to discover
the sensitivity of the results to the chosen assumptions.
Table 3.3 summarizes the results of the three methods by industry
classification. Again, in all classifications, temporary employment
reductions are far less important than those that are permanent.
The results of methods 1 and 2 are based on all 822,713 establish
ments, while those of method 3 represent 614,479 establishments (or
75 percent of the population). Not surprisingly for this time period,
those classifications with typically stable employment finance, real
estate, and insurance, and general government have the highest per
centage of permanent employment reductions. Note that there is very
little deviation in the results when establishments are analyzed in the
aggregate. The importance of permanent declines ranges only from 62
to 64 percent. Within some classifications, however, there are substan
tial deviations in the results of the three methods. The largest occurs in
the finance, real estate, and insurance category, where there is an 11
percentage point differential between the results of method 2 (6
months) and method 3.
Establishments with fewer than 100 employees account for approxi
mately 98 percent of all establishments in the study population. Table
3.4 indicates that these establishments consistently show a lower per
centage of permanent employment reductions than the other size
groups. Given the overall percentage of permanent employment
declines for all establishments in table 3.4 (approximately 62 percent),
it is clear that the sheer number of smaller establishments conceals the
high percentage of employment declines in larger establishments.

Table 3.3 Permanent Employment Reductions by Industry Classification (Texas, 1978-1989)
Method 2
Method 1
9 months
6 months
6 months
(%)
(%)
(%)
Industry
66
70
75
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery
62
64
68
Mining, quarrying, and construction
57
56
66
Manufacturing
62
67
59
Transportation, utilities, and communications
58
60
65
Trade
75
79
70
Finance, real estate, and insurance
64
70
63
Services
73
71
79
General government
60
67
60
Bankruptcies
62
64
62
All establishments

Method 3
6 months
(%)
72
66
66
64
60
68
64
79
64
64

SOURCE: Based on Ul-covered establishment data from 1978 to 1989 from the Texas Employment Commission.
NOTE: The percentage of permanent employment reductions is calculated as the number of permanent employment reductions divided by total employ
ment reductions times 100.
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Using method 2 (6 months), the larger establishments exhibit perma
nent employment reductions of 80 percent, while the smaller establish
ments exhibit only a 61 percent figure.
Table 3.4 Permanent Employment Reductions by Size of Establishment
(Texas, 1978-1989)
Number of
employees
Under 100
101-500
501-1,000
1,001-2,000
2,001-5,000
Over 5,000

Method 1
6 months
(%)
61
70
79
73
80
79

Method 2
6 months
9 months
(%)
(%)
61
53
70
63
79
75
80
77
77
80
79
75

Method 3
6 months
(%)
60
66
71
73
74
73

SOURCE: Based on Ul-covered establishment data from 1978 to 1989 from the Texas Employ
ment Commission.
NOTE: The percentage of permanent employment reductions is calculated as the number of per
manent employment reductions divided by total employment reductions times 100.

Within size classifications, the largest deviation of 8 percent occurs
in the smallest classification between methods 1 and 2 (9 months) and
also between methods 2 (6 months) and 2 (9 months), and, in the 5011,000 classification, between methods 1 and 3 and between methods 2
(6 months) and 3.6

Concluding Remarks
The determination of the appropriate theoretical model of how the
costs of unemployment benefits should be optimally allocated hinges
on the relative importance of insured temporary and permanent layoffs.
The measure of permanent employment reductions is only a proxy for
insured permanent layoffs. However, the sheer magnitude of the results
suggests that, even if insured permanent layoffs represent only half of
the permanent employment reductions, they are substantial enough not
to be overlooked.
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NOTES
1. In 1978, employment at firms in the sample was 2,602,410, as compared with total employ
ment at all firms in Texas of 4,306,277 (see Employment and Training Handbook No. 394, p.476).
2. Note that Murphy and Topel (1987) use information on spells in progress. Thus, some lay
offs that are counted as temporary could well be permanent, ex post.
3. As an example, suppose that there are 38 temporary layoffs, 52 permanent layoffs, and 10
quits. With quits included as a permanent decline, the percentage of permanent employment
declines is 62 percent. If we exclude quits, the calculation is 58 percent (52/90).
4. This special relationship may not be permanently broken when the worker is unable to find
work elsewhere (i.e. during a major downturn). UI allows for an additional 13 weeks of extended
benefits.
5. Note that we are only calculating employment declines, rather than increases in employ
ment.
6. One might conjecture that the lower percentage of permanent employment reductions for
the smallest establishment size classification could stem from the growth of small establishments.
Hence, age may be important. The data did not afford the opportunity to classify establishments
by age.

Funding Reemployment Costs
When Job Losses are Permanent
Most of the previous theoretical writing on experience rating in
unemployment insurance (UI) has been concerned with temporary lay
offs and unemployment. The literature seems to provide no detailed
theoretical analyses of the role of experience rating in UI when layoffs
are permanent. 1 Permanent layoffs necessitate the transfer of workers
from a contracting to another expanding sector (or into nonparticipation) and such moves involve costs such as those caused by retraining
and geographic relocation. Presumably, UI is designed to cover some
or all of these costs. The question arises as to who should be responsi
ble for payment of these costs, or, alternatively, how should the system
be experience rated?
In this chapter, we attempt to answer these questions by analyzing
how the costs of permanent employment reductions ought to be allo
cated in order to achieve a specified socially optimal objective. An
intuitive explanation of the economic model used in the analysis is pre
sented in the body of the chapter. Alternatively, readers who prefer a
presentation that also includes a more technical exposition are referred
to the chapter appendix (which covers the material in the next three
sections) and then to the concluding section of this chapter.
The general structure of the analysis is described in the remainder of
this section. In the following section, the socially optimal rate of per
manent layoffs is derived. The third section provides the analysis of
permanent layoffs in the framework of market economies using four
different methods of paying for the costs, i.e., via displaced workers,
employers in the contracting sector, employers in the expanding sector,
and the government. The consequences of the four assumptions are
then determined. In the fourth section, the theoretical framework is
made more realistic by introducing an explicit "waiting," "queuing," or
"training" period through which laid-off workers must pass before they
can relocate to another job. This period lengthens as total layoffs
increase. Our findings are summarized in the final section.
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In order to focus on the essential issue, the basic structure of the
analysis is quite simple. There are only two sectors (or industries): one
produces output X, and the other produces output Y. Labor is the only
factor of production, and the total labor supply in the economy is fixed,
although labor can move between the two sectors. In much of the anal
ysis, there is no explicit unemployment, so that the sum of employment
in both sectors equals total employment.
Initially, this economy is in equilibrium, in the sense that a unit of
labor generates the same marginal utility (that is, the same additional
value or well-being) for the representative consumer in either industry
X or industry Y. Suppose, however, that this initial equilibrium is dis
turbed by a change in tastes towards good Y, which raises its marginal
utility. As a result, consumers want more of good Y and less of good X.
To satisfy this new preference, a shift of workers from the produc
tion of good X to the production of good Y is required. However, mov
ing these workers is not costless. If it were, the flow of workers to the Y
sector would take place instantaneously. The costs of adjustment are
associated with such factors as unemployment compensation, search
ing for a new job, retraining, and geographic relocation, and are
incurred by the former employer, the employee, the government, or the
new employer. Unemployment compensation constitutes a substantial
proportion of these costs. The faster the flow of labor from sector X to
sector y, the higher are both the total and marginal costs of the employ
ment adjustment. This basic model of an economy sets the stage for the
analysis that follows.

The Socially Optimal Rate of Permanent Layoffs
We now assume that there is a benevolent dictator who seeks to
maximize the representative consumer©s utility but recognizes that
there are adjustment costs. The dictator is responsible for moving labor
from sector X to sector y at a socially optimal rate. That is, the benevo
lent dictator wishes to maximize the utility derived from the consump
tion of X and Y, adjusted for the costs of transferring labor from sector
X to sector y Since the adjustment takes time, it is the present value of
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present and future net utilities, not the instantaneous level of net utility,
that should be maximized.
The economy is in equilibrium initially, but, with the change in
tastes, a marginal unit of labor now generates more utility in sector Y
than in sector X. In the presence of adjustment costs, how fast should
the benevolent dictator shift labor from sector X to sector F?
The marginal cost of shifting an extra unit of labor from sector X to
sector Y is equal to the marginal adjustment cost. The marginal benefit
of moving this unit of labor is the excess of the extra utility gained
from its employment in industry Y over the utility lost in industry X. As
more of good Y is produced, its marginal utility declines, and as less of
good X is produced, its marginal utility rises. In other words, the con
sumer places less value on the consumption of additional units of a
particular good. Thus, the marginal benefit of increasing employment
in sector Y declines as more and more labor is moved from sector X to
sector Y.
Since labor is moved gradually, this net benefit accrues not only in
one period but over all periods until the new equilibrium is reached.
The future benefits must be discounted at the social rate of discount
and then summed over all periods. For the dictator©s actions to be
socially optimal, the present value of the net marginal benefits of mov
ing one unit of labor must be equal to the marginal adjustment costs.
The optimal rate of adjustment of employment in sectors X and Y is
rapid at first but then slows down until the new long-run equilibrium is
reached. This is so because initially, as labor is shifted from industry X
to industry Y, the net benefit derived from transferring labor is high, and
thus the flow of labor is high. As the marginal benefit of the labor trans
fer declines, the flow of labor also declines.

Adjustment Paths in Market Economies
Let us now postulate the existence of output, labor, and capital mar
kets and examine how adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium
would take place. Four versions of the competitive model are analyzed.
They differ in the assumptions about which agents are responsible for
the payment of the adjustment costs. In case A, the workers who move
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from industry X to industry Y have to pay for these costs. In case B, the
employers in the contracting industry X bear the payment responsibil
ity. In case C, the employers in the expanding sector Y are required to
pay for the costs of moving labor. Finally, in case D, a third party, such
as the government, pays the adjustment costs but does not actually con
trol the movement of labor from industry X to industry K

Case A: Displaced Workers Pay the Adjustment Costs
In a perfectly competitive market, employees are paid the value of
their marginal product; that is, the wage is equal to the price of the
product times the marginal product of the last worker hired. For exam
ple, if good 7 sells for $5 and the last worker hired produces three units
of 7 in an hour, the wage in industry Y is equal to $15 an hour. Of
course, the marginal product of all previous workers hired is higher
than that of the last worker because of diminishing marginal productiv
ity of labor.
Since labor is assumed to be homogeneous, long-run equilibrium
requires that the wage in the X industry be equal to the wage in the Y
industry. In other words, there is no incentive for workers to move from
one sector to the other.
As before, the economy©s initial equilibrium is disturbed by a shift
in tastes, which raises the marginal utility of good Y. In competitive
markets, the price of good X and the wage in industry X fall in relation
to those in industry Y, so that now wages in industry Y are higher. With
no adjustment costs, labor would move immediately from sector X to
sector Y, which would reestablish the equality of the two wage rates.
With adjustment costs, however, workers in industry X face two
options. They may stay in that sector and receive a relatively low
income stream. Alternatively, these workers may move to industry y
and, for some time, receive a relatively high income stream.
Workers, however, cannot obtain the high income stream of industry
y without paying the costs of moving. Let the price of moving be equal
to the marginal adjustment cost. Thus, an individual worker will move
when total earnings in industry Y (properly discounted) exceed total
earnings in industry X by more than the cost of moving. The optimal
rate of movement is obtained when the marginal worker is indifferent
between staying in one sector and moving to the other. It can be shown
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that the conditions for the optimal transfer of labor from sector X to
sector Y under a benevolent dictator and under the present competitive
conditions, respectively, are equivalent. (See the chapter appendix for
the formal proof.)
Having established that the flow of labor from sector X to sector Y is
socially optimal, under the assumed circumstances, now consider what
happens to the incomes of workers and employers. First, all initial
employees in sector X lose income in relation to the income earned by
employees in sector Y. This loss is equal to the (properly discounted)
difference between the wages in the two industries. Employees who
remain in sector X receive the lower wage, and employees who move to
sector Y receive the higher wage but must pay the adjustment cost.
After proper discounting, the adjustment cost is just equal to the
remaining difference between the wage in industry Y and the wage in
industry X in the long run.
Second, what happens to nonlabor incomes in industry XI The rep
resentative firm©s gross revenue per employee is equal to the price of
good X times the average product of labor (average output produced
per worker). Since the firm©s wage per employee is equal to the price of
X times the marginal product of labor, the firm©s total nonlabor income
(per employee) in any one year is equal to the price of good X times the
difference between the average product and marginal product of labor.
In accordance with the theory of the firm, let us assume that
1. the average product of labor is greater than or equal to the mar
ginal product of labor,
2. both the average product of labor and the marginal product of
labor are falling as employment in industry X rises, and
3. the marginal product of labor falls faster than the average product
of labor, resulting in an increase in the difference between the
average product and marginal product as employment in sector X
rises.
Initially, the relative price of X falls, and thus nonlabor income must
fall. Afterwards, however, employment in sector X falls, the price of X
rises, and the difference between the average and marginal product of
labor falls, which means that nonlabor income may increase or
decrease. The precise path of nonlabor income depends on the parame-
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ter values of the production and utility functions. However, it seems
reasonable and realistic to assume that the net present value of the
change in nonlabor income during the entire adjustment period is nega
tive.
The third dimension is the income of workers in sector Y. Initially,
employment in the industry rises, and so the marginal productivity of
labor declines. This means that the real wage falls. It need not, how
ever, fall in terms of the real purchasing power of both X and Y.
Employees initially in sector Y enjoy a higher income during the
adjustment period than do those in sector X.
Finally, consider the industry©s nonlabor income, which is given by
the difference between the average and marginal products of labor in
sector Y times employment in this sector. Initially, employment in the
industry begins to rise, which, in turn, raises the difference between the
average and marginal products of labor. Hence, nonlabor income must
rise.
The discussion in this section thus far has been based on the
assumption that wages in industry X are flexible. Since wage and price
stickiness seems to be quite common in many actual economies, we
will address briefly what might happen when the wage in sector X
remains at its original level, while the value of the marginal product
falls initially. Profit maximization by employers in industry X would
require the layoff of some employees, in order for the value of the mar
ginal product to equal that initial sticky wage. This means that output
of X falls and that both the price of good X and the marginal product of
labor in this industry rise. In contrast to the previous adjustments, how
ever, employment and output in sector Y do not increase.
Unemployed workers in industry X now evaluate two alternatives.
First, they may search for a job in their industry and, if successful, dis
place another employee and earn the initial wage. Second, they may
pay the adjustment costs, relocate to sector Y and earn the wage there.
If unemployed workers maximize their net expected incomes, they will
be indifferent between remaining in sector X and moving to sector Y
when the marginal adjustment costs equal the net present value of the
difference between the wage in industry Y minus the product of the
wage in industry X and the probability that the unemployed worker can
find a job in industry X. This condition is not identical to that of the
benevolent dictator. In particular, it has often been suggested that laid-
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off employees may be overly optimistic about finding a job in their
own sector, especially when many layoffs are temporary. This would
result in an overestimate of the probability of finding a job in industry
X, which, in turn, would imply a suboptimal flow of labor to the other
sector.
There is another reason why this flow of labor may be suboptimal in
case A. It is very likely that unemployed workers face imperfect capital
markets so that, for instance, they may not be able to borrow funds to
finance the adjustment costs. In that situation, the movement of work
ers from sector X to sector Y would be lower than the socially optimal
flow. (The appendix provides a more rigorous discussion of this point.)
Case B: Employers in the Contracting Industry
Bear the Adjustment Costs
We now turn to a different regime of paying for the adjustment
costs. In particular, by law or by custom, the employers in the contract
ing sector X are fully responsible for this payment for all employees
who separate from the sector.
An employer in this industry faces the situation in which, initially,
the price of X falls, so that the value of the marginal product of labor
also falls. If the wage does not decline by an equal amount, the
employer lays off workers. However, the employer now has to pay the
costs of moving labor to sector Y. Hence, the layoff decision is deter
mined not only by the difference between the value of the marginal
product and the wage, but also by the adjustment costs. Specifically, a
profit-maximizing employer will lay off a marginal worker when the
associated present and future labor cost savings exceed the marginal
adjustment costs.
What is the level of the wage rate in industry XI Since firms in this
sector are responsible for the adjustment costs of all workers who
move (whether due to layoffs or to voluntary quits), the wage tends to
equality with the wage paid in sector Y. To see why this is so, consider
the circumstance in which initially the wage in industry X is less than
the wage in industry Y. All employees in sector X then wish to be
moved because they can earn a higher wage in the other industry and
all costs of moving are paid by firms in sector X. This, however, would
entail great total adjustment costs for employers in sector X, who are,
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therefore, induced to maintain their wages at the level of the Y sector.
In that case, employees in industry X are indifferent between (1) stay
ing, and (2) being laid off and moving to industry Y.
Firms in sector X initiate layoffs and transfers of labor to sector Y.
Thus, the system is in equilibrium when the rate of layoffs implies
marginal adjustment costs equal to the present value of the difference
between the value of the marginal product (wage) in sector Y and the
value of the marginal product of labor (which is less than the wage) in
sector X. This is the same socially optimal rate of flow of labor from
sector X to sector Y that occurred with the benevolent dictator.
The marginal product of labor in sector Y determines both indus
tries© wages. As labor flows from sector X to sector Y, the marginal
product of labor in sector Y and wages in both sectors gradually fall
until the new long-run level of wages is attained.
What are the implications of case B for the distribution of income?
Since workers in both industries receive identical real wages, there is
no change in the relative distribution of wage incomes. Compared with
case A, however, workers in industry X receive a higher real wage and
workers in industry Y receive the same real wage.
Firms in sector X must now pay the adjustment costs. However,
compared with case A, there are further costs. Nonlabor income in
industry X is reduced: first, employers must pay the adjustment costs,
and, second, employers must continue to pay the relatively high wage
of industry Y despite the decline in the value of labor©s marginal prod
uct in industry X. With employers in sector X paying for the adjustment
costs, nonlabor incomes in sector Y tend to rise, as in case A.
Case C: Employers in the Expanding Industry
Bear the Adjustment Costs
In this situation, by custom or law, employers in the expanding sec
tor Y are obliged to bear the costs of transferring labor to their industry.
As before, the marginal utility of Y rises initially. Firms in the expand
ing sector hire workers in sector X at the industry Y wage, pay the mov
ing costs, and then employ this labor. Employers will engage in this
practice as long as the marginal adjustment cost is less than the present
value of the difference between the value of the marginal product and
the wage in industry Y.
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What is the wage for workers who have moved from sector X and
are now working in sector Yl Competition among the employers in sec
tor Y ensures that wages are equal to the marginal productivity of labor
in that industry, no matter where the workers originated or who paid
the adjustment costs. It is only under imperfectly competitive condi
tions that the wage of the newly hired workers in industry Y may fall
short of marginal productivity. For instance, it may be possible that
employers in sector Y can contractually bind individuals from sector X
to work at a wage less than marginal productivity, in return for the
employers© paying the moving costs. However, such indenture con
tracts are rarely enforceable in courts of law.
Since the wage in industry Y for the newly hired workers is likely to
exceed the value of the marginal product in industry X and may well be
equal to the value of the marginal product in industry Y, we conclude
that the equilibrium condition is typically not the same as the socially
optimal condition. Specifically, the adjustment rate is less than the
socially optimal one. When employers in sector Y behave competitively
in the labor market, the profit-maximizing flow of labor from one sec
tor to the other is zero. In other words, when employers in sector Y
must pay their transferred workers the full value of the marginal prod
uct in sector Y in addition to the adjustment costs, they have no motive
for hiring them and no labor will be transferred.
It may be worth noting that regulations requiring employers in the
expanding sector to pay for the adjustment costs cannot be imple
mented easily. It is hard to identify employees who have moved from
contracting sectors. Further, a tax or charge on new hires would have
undesirable, negative incentive effects.

Case D: Government Bears the Adjustment Costs
In the last three subsections, we have examined situations in which
the adjustment costs are internalized to employers or employees who
also control the rate of flow of labor. We now postulate crucially differ
ent circumstances, whereby the government, without direct control
over the number of layoffs, pays the adjustment costs for any worker
who has been laid off permanently in sector X. The adjustment costs
are paid from general revenues, which, in turn, are financed by general
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taxes or by borrowing. None of these taxes, however, is linked directly
to employers© or employees© layoff, hiring, or moving decisions.
As before, the marginal utility of good Y rises, leading to a decline in
the relative price of good X and in the value of the marginal product of
labor in X. The wage in sector X, however, remains equal to the wage in
sector Y. Layoffs are costless to employers in sector X; thus, workers
are laid off immediately, maintaining the equality of the value of the
marginal products in both sectors. The government pays, more or less
immediately, the adjustment costs for all layoffs and requires that
workers relocate to the other sector. The new equilibrium is achieved
virtually instantaneously. Given our basic assumption of rising mar
ginal adjustment costs, this instantaneous adjustment would be nonoptimally fast and very costly. Alternatively, if the government somehow
were to ration the payments of the adjustment costs, structural unem
ployment would likely result.

From Theory to Practice
The theoretical framework of the previous sections is now modified
in order to approximate current UI practices. In all states, qualified
workers receive weekly unemployment benefits for the period of their
joblessness (subject to a maximum duration of normally 26 weeks). In
the preceding theoretical approach, by contrast, unemployment is ruled
out, for the most part, because workers are transferred to sector Y
immediately upon layoff and/or payment of the marginal adjustment
cost. In order to account for unemployment explicitly, we now postu
late that the relocation process consists of a time of joblessness during
which employees, who have left sector X, search for or wait for work in
sector Y. The length of this unemployment period cannot be influenced
by individual workers, but it lengthens with the total number of work
ers who leave the contracting sector.
Consider again case A, in which laid-off employees bear the costs of
unemployment as well as any additional financial costs of moving from
sector X to sector Y. Further, wages in both industries are fully flexible
and adjust to their respective marginal products at all times. Employees
in sector X have the choice of (1) remaining in the sector and receiving
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that wage, or (2) leaving the sector, waiting for a period of D, and then
receiving the wage in sector Y minus the cost of transferring between
industries.
If, initially, the switch to sector Y yields a higher net present value of
future earnings minus the adjustment costs than staying in sector X,
individual workers will move. As more and more do so, the unemploy
ment duration and the additional adjustment costs rise. The earnings
stream in sector Y is postponed, and thus the net present value of these
earnings falls. The costs of adjustment rise until the equilibrium rate of
transfer is reached; this occurs when individual workers are indifferent
between staying in or leaving sector X.
The marginal adjustment costs are now the sum of the net present
value of the wages foregone in sector Y because of the waiting period
and any additional financial adjustment costs. In this case, the equilib
rium rate of transfer of labor is identical to that of the socially optimal
rate.
A UI system is now introduced in which unemployment benefits are
paid to laid-off workers and are usually charged partially to the recipi
ents© previous employers in sector X. In the theory of case B in the pre
ceding section, the firms in the contracting sector are directly
responsible for both the implementation and the costs of relocation. In
practice, however, employers only make layoff decisions, and, with the
present assumptions, laid-off employees relocate to a new job after a
waiting or searching period and paying an additional financial adjust
ment cost. While on layoff, up to a maximum duration, workers receive
weekly unemployment benefits. Does the current experience-rating
system induce firms to lay off workers (permanently) at a rate equal to
the socially optimal rate of transfer?
The firm©s layoff decision can be presented formally as follows.
Usually, firms are required to pay only some proportion of the UI ben
efits received by their laid-off workers. Thus, only a fraction of the
present value of the benefits received by the laid-off worker represents
the marginal tax costs of layoffs to the typical firm in the declining sec
tor.
The marginal benefits from layoffs that accrue to the firm are the net
present value of the difference between the wage and the value of the
marginal product. The firm lays off workers as long as the marginal tax
costs of layoffs are less than their marginal benefits. As the layoffs of
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the representative firm and thus total layoffs increase, there is an
increase in unemployment duration and consequently in the present
value of the UI benefits received by the laid-off workers. With a par
tially experience-rated tax rate, the firm©s marginal tax costs of layoffs
will, therefore, rise. The firm©s optimal layoffs occur when these mar
ginal tax costs are just equal to the marginal benefits of layoffs.
To understand whether the firm©s optimal layoff is also the socially
optimal one, the wage rate in sector X needs to be ascertained. This
determination is made in the framework of two alternative assump
tions. First, it is assumed that markets are perfect, so that wages in sec
tor X are flexible. The second approach is to assume that wages in
sector X are inflexible and are equal to wages in sector Y.
When the wage rates in industry X are flexible, their present value
must be determined by the equality of the properly discounted income
streams in sectors X and Y. In particular, the present value of wages in
industry X must equal the present value of earnings in industry Y (after
the period of unemployment), plus the unemployment benefits, less the
financial costs of transferring to industry Y.
What determines the layoff rate of the employer? In this case, the
employer does not pay the full cost of the UI benefits, but only a frac
tion thereof, and the unemployment benefits are less than the wage in
sector Y (typically, benefits are 40 to 60 percent of wages). The result
ing layoff rate will be higher than the socially optimal rate because the
latter imposes the full adjustment cost on the employer. Thus, imper
fect experience rating leads to higher-than-optimal layoffs by firms,
resulting in higher-than-optimal levels of unemployment. Increases in
the degree of experience rating would reduce the firm©s layoff rate and
bring it closer to the socially optimal one.
Under the second set of conditions, the relative wages in sector X are
inflexible and are equal to the wages in sector Y. With the current
assumptions, the optimal transfer of labor from industry X to industry Y
requires that the present value of the proportion of unemployment ben
efits paid by the employer be equal to the present value of the wage in
sector Y from the time of layoff to the time of hire in that sector plus
any additional costs of transfer. The profit-maximizing layoff decision
leads to layoffs and an unemployment duration that are in excess of
what is socially optimal. Socially optimal layoffs and unemployment
duration may be achieved by raising the proportion of benefits charged

Funding Reemployment Costs When Job Losses are Permanent 61

to the employer or by raising unemployment benefits. For that purpose,
the increase in benefits need not actually be paid to the unemployed
workers. Its function is to raise the marginal costs of layoffs, so that the
rate of layoffs and therefore the duration and level of unemployment
are reduced toward their social optima.

Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, the role of experience rating in UI has been reexamined in the context of permanent layoffs. Previous investigations have
been largely confined to temporary layoffs. Our main findings are as
follows:
1. Socially optimal rates of labor transfer from contracting to
expanding sectors can be achieved by charging the costs of trans
fer either to the (permanently) laid-off workers or to the employ
ers in the contracting sector. Charging laid-off workers, however,
requires fully flexible wages and perfect capital markets. When
wages are sticky, charging employers may still achieve an opti
mal outcome.
2. Whoever is responsible for paying the transfer costs will suffer a
loss of income (at least, in the short run).
3. Charging the transfer costs to employers in the expanding sector(s) would be socially optimal only if extremely complicated
rules could be enforced. Consequently, we rule out this alterna
tive.
4. Financing the transfer costs partially or wholly by a general tax
would lead to nonoptimally high transfers or to high structural
unemployment.
5. When wages are inflexible, employers are charged and experience
rated imperfectly and the unemployment benefits fall short of
wages. Then permanent layoffs tend to be larger than optimal. To
achieve the optimal outcome in these cases, employer charges
should be increased, even though they may exceed benefits.
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Our general conclusion is that "full" experience rating is a highly
desirable UI property for permanent, as well as for temporary, layoffs.
Indeed, in some circumstances, the system ought to be "more than
fully" experience rated to achieve the socially optimal adjustment. In
practice, however, the goal of socially optimal transfers will, as always,
be balanced against considerations of equity, that is, can the declining
sector afford a higher UI tax?
NOTES
l.As mentioned previosly, temporary layoffs are here defined as employment separations that
are reversed by recalls or new hires after a relatively short period of time. Temporary, unlike per
manent, layoffs do not lead to long-run reductions in the employer©s workforce. Typical examples
of the literature on temporary layoffs are Feldstein (1976), Wolcowitz (1984), and Cook (1992).

Appendix to Chapter 4
The Formal Two-Sector Model
The following sections mirror those in the body of the chapter but offer a
formal presentation of the theoretical framework.
In this model, we assume initially that there is no explicit unemployment so
that
where N is the total labor force and Nx and Ny stand for employment in sectors
X and Y. The production functions in the two sectors are given by
Y=h(Ny) = h(N-Nx).
The marginal products of labor in the two sectors, MPX(= g©) and MPy(= h©),
are positive and declining, that is,
g© > 0, g" < 0, and
K > 0, h" < 0.
There is a representative consumer with a utility function,
U(X, Y).
The marginal utilities of goods X and Y, MUX(= Ux) and MUy(= Uy), are pos
itive and declining, that is,
Ux > 0, Uxx < 0, and
Uy >Q, Uyy <0.
It is also convenient to assume that the marginal utility of X rises with the
consumption of Y and vice versa, that is,
^y>0.

When employed in sector X, a unit of labor generates a marginal utility of
MUX MPX, when employed in sector Y, a unit of labor generates a marginal util
ity ofMUy MPy. Thus, the equilibrium condition is MUX MPX = MUy MPy. This
condition can be derived formally by maximizing the utility function subject to
the stated constraints:
Max U(X, Y)
subject to
X = g(Nx), Y = h(Ny) and Nx + Ny = N.
The initial equilibrium can be illustrated by means of a simple diagram.
Figure 4.1 includes a production possibilities curve (PPC) and an indifference
curve (/!), which is derived from the utility function of the representative con
sumer. Maximum utility is achieved at the point of tangency (E^) of the two
curves. This point is defined by the equality of the slope of the indifference
curve, namely MUX /MUy, and the slope of the production possibilities curve,
MPx IMPy.
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The initial equilibrium (f^) is disturbed by an exogenous change in tastes,
for example, which raises the marginal utility of Y. As a result, the new indif
ference curve is /2, and the new long-run equilibrium is E^, with increased lev
els of Y and Ny and reduced levels of X and Nx.
Figure 4.1

Equilibrium in the Two-Sector Model

If the movement from E\ to £2 were costless, then the economy would shift
to EI instantaneously. In the present model, however, there are adjustment
costs that prevent an immediate adjustment. Unemployment compensation
constitutes a substantial proportion of these adjustment costs in the case of per
manent layoffs.
There is a flow of labor ( N ) from sector X to sector Y. It is plausible that
faster adjustment involves both higher total and higher marginal costs of ad
justment. Consequently, we assume that the adjustment cost function is similar
to that in figure 4.2. When adjustment is zero, both total and marginal adjust
ment costs are zero. As the rate of adjustment increases, both the height and the
slope of the function rise. Formally, the properties of the adjustment cost func
tion are stated as follows:
/(A>)>0forall A> >0
when/©(A/) > 0, /" (A>) > 0 and
when/(0) = 0, /©(0) = 0.
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Figure 4.2 The Adjustment Cost Function

Adjustment
costs f(N)

Adjustment cost function

Flow of labor from X to Y
This type of adjustment cost is likely to cause a gradual adjustment from EI
to #2, because instantaneous adjustment would be prohibitively expensive.
The Socially Optimal Rate of Permanent Layoffs
We now assume that there is a benevolent dictator who wishes to maximize
the utility of a representative consumer while recognizing the existence of ad
justment costs. The appropriate maximization problem can be stated formally
as the exponential function:
(4.1)

MaxV, = J [I/(Xr rt)-

-P(T-0

subject to: X = g(Nx)
Y = h(Ny)
N = Nx+Ny.
The letter p stands for the social rate of discount, the adjustment costs/(N) are
measured in the same units as utility, and e (= 2.71828) represents the discount
function. Throughout this appendix, the following notation with respect to time
indexes is maintained. A change in tastes (or technology) occurs at time f0- The
subscript t refers to any period including and subsequent to f0 and the subscript
T refers to any period including and subsequent to t. In symbols, t0 < t < 1 < oo. 1
The preceding objective function states that the benevolent dictator wishes to
maximize the utility derived from the consumption of X and Y, adjusted for the
costs of transferring labor from sector X to sector Y. Since the adjustment takes
time, it is the present value of present and future net utilities that should be
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maximized, not the instantaneous level of net utility. This present value is rep
resented by Vt in equation (4.1).
Initially, the economy is in equilibrium at point E in figure 4.1. As men
tioned, in this initial equilibrium MUX MPX = MUy MPy (or Ux g© = Uy h©) and
f (N ) = 0 because W = 0. At time ?Q, there is a shift in tastes (or production
technology) so that now MUy MPy > MUX MPX. In other words, a marginal unit
of labor now generates more utility in sector Y than in sector X. In the presence
of adjustment costs, how fast should the benevolent dictator shift labor from
sector X to sector F?
This maximization problem can be solved mathematically by standard tech
niques of optimal control theory. We favor the following slightly less formal
and more heuristic solution. The marginal cost of shifting an extra unit of labor
from sector X to sector Y is equal to the marginal adjustment cost, namely
f (N). The marginal benefit of moving this unit of labor is the extra utility
gained from its employment in industry Y minus the utility lost in industry X.
In any one period, this excess is measured by (MUy MPy - MUX MPX) or, equivalently by (Uy h© - Ux g©). Since labor is moved gradually, this net benefit ac
crues not only in one period but over all periods until the new equilibrium (£2
in figure 4.1) is reached. The future benefits must be discounted at the social
rate of discount p and then summed. For the dictator©s actions to be socially op
timal, the present value of the net marginal benefits of moving one unit of labor
must be equal to the marginal adjustment costs. Formally, this condition can be
stated as
(4.2)

f©(Nt) =

which must hold for all time periods after and including f0, that is, for t > fy.
When this condition is differentiated with respect to time, the so-called Euler
equation of the calculus of variations is obtained.
The optimal rate of adjustment of employment in sectors X and Y to the new
equilibrium is illustrated in figure 4.3. Initially, Nx is relatively high, and A^ is
relatively low. At f0, the change in tastes occurs, and the benevolent dictator
allocates labor according to equation (4.2). As illustrated in figure 4.3, the ad
justment is rapid at first but then slows down until the new steady state is
reached at t*. As labor is shifted from sector X to sector Y, the marginal product
of labor rises in sector X and falls in sector Y. Similarly, the marginal utility of
X rises and that of Y falls. In other words, as labor is moved from X to Y, MUX
MPX rises and MUy MPy falls until, in the new steady state, they are again equal.
Initially, the net benefit derived from transferring labor is high, and hence N
is high. As (MUy MPy - MUX MPX) declines, the flow of labor also declines.
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Figure 4.3 Optimal Employment Adjustment
Employment
in sectors
XandY

Time

Adjustment Paths in Market Economies
Here we include output, labor, and capital markets to examine how adjust
ment to the new steady state would take place. Four versions of the competitive
model are studied; these are based on different assumptions about which agents
are responsible for the payment of the adjustment costs.
In market models, prices (Px and Py) and wages (wx and wy) play an impor
tant role. For convenience, let Py be the numeraire, so that Py = 1. Hence, fac
tors such as wages, incomes, and adjustment costs are all measured in units of
Y. The representative consumer maximizes his/her utility subject to a budget
constraint. This implies the equality of the marginal rate of substitution with
the price ratio, or
(4.3)

MU/MUy = Px

Equation (4.3) is assumed to hold in all four versions of the market model, both
during the adjustment periods and in the steady states.
Case A: Displaced Workers Pay the Adjustment Costs
To begin, we postulate a perfectly competitive version of the model, such
that employees are paid the values of their marginal products:
wx = PX MPX and wy = MPy.
These two conditions are satisfied both during the adjustment period and in
steady states.
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Since labor is assumed to be homogeneous, steady state equilibrium re
quires that wx = Wy or Px MPX = MPy. After substituting for Px from equation
(4.3), we obtain
MUy /MUx = MPx /MPy,
which is the tangency condition illustrated in figure 4.1.
As before, the economy©s initial equilibrium is disturbed at time f0 by a shift
in tastes, which raises MUy. In competitive markets, Px and wx fall relative to
Py and wy, so that now, wy > wx. With no adjustment costs, labor would move
immediately from sector X to sector Y which would reestablish the equality of
the two wage rates. Wage maximizing behavior by employees would establish
the new equilibrium instantaneously at £2 in figure 4.1. With adjustment costs,
however, workers in industry X face two options. They may stay in their indus
try and receive a relatively low income stream, which has a present value of
(4.4)
v ©

NPV = r
xt

--r(T ~ r)

where r stands for a representative rate of interest at which future earnings are
discounted. Alternatively, the workers in industry X may move to industry Y
and receive a relatively high income stream, which has a present value of
(4.5)

NPVyt, =

The workers cannot, however, obtain NPVyt without paying the costs of
moving to industry Y. Let the price of moving be equal to the marginal adjust
ment cost. The individual worker will move if
(4.6)

[NPVyt -V(N)] ^NPVxt

where ty©(N) stands for the marginal adjustment cost, measured in units of Y.
Thus, an individual worker will move to industry Y when total earnings in that
sector (properly discounted) exceed total earnings in industry X by more than
the cost of moving. The optimal rate of movement is obtained when the mar
ginal worker is indifferent between staying in industry X and moving to indus
try Y, that is, when
(A 7^
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or, since wages are equal to the values of their marginal products:
(4.7©)

<>© (,)=

(MP

- Px% MPXT ) e~r (T © rfu

Equations (4.2) and (4.7©), which present the conditions for the optimal transfer
of labor from sector X to sector Y under a benevolent dictator and under com
petitive conditions can be shown to be equivalent. First, substitute MUX IMUy
for Px in equation (4.7©) and second, multiply the entire equation by MUy. Then
the left-hand side of the resulting equation is MUy ty©(Nt ). Since ty©(Nt ) is the
marginal adjustment cost measured in units of Y, while /© (Nt ) is the same cost
measured in utility units, it follows that
f(Nt) = MUyV(fi).
The only remaining difference between equations (4.2) and (4.7©) is the rate of
discount. In equation (4.2), it is p, the social rate of discount, while in equation
(4.7©), it is r, the representative market rate of interest. If all markets, and in par
ticular the capital market, are perfectly competitive, then the representative
market rate of interest equals the social rate of discount. Thus, equations (4.2)
and (4.7©) are indeed equivalent and yield the same optimal rate of transfer of
labor from sector X to sector Y.
The optimal paths of labor in industry X and industry Y under competitive
conditions are the same as those under the benevolent dictator and have already
been illustrated in figure 4.3. Figure 4.4 illustrates the corresponding move
ment of wages in the two industries. The change in tastes at time f0 reduces Px
relative to Py and, hence, wx falls relative to wy. Thereafter, as labor flows from
sector X to sector Y, output of X falls and output of Y rises, MPX rises and MPy
falls, MUX rises and MUy falls, and Px rises relative to Py(= 1). This means that
wx rises and wy falls until the new long-run equilibrium is established at time t*
at which wx = ny
Having determined that the flow of labor from sector X to sector Y (that is,
N) is socially optimal under the assumed circumstances, we now consider
what happens to the incomes of workers and employers. First, all initial em
ployees in sector X lose income in relation to that earned by employees in sec
tor Y. This loss is equal to the (properly discounted) area between the upper wy
line and the lower wx line in figure 4.4. Employees who remain in industry X
receive the lower wage wx, and employees who move to industry Y receive the
higher wage wy but must pay the adjustment cost, which, after proper discount
ing, is just equal to the remaining difference between wy and wx. Thus, com-
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pared to workers in sector Y, each employee who is in sector X at IQ suffers an
income loss between f0 and t*, which, in net present value terms, is equal to
-r(l-tQ)

(4.8)

di

Workers© loss^.= I

Second, what happens to nonlabor incomes in sector XI The representative
firm©s gross revenue per employee is PX APX, where APX stands for the average
product of labor. Since the wage per employee is Px MPX, the firm©s total nonlabor income in any one year is Px (APX - MPX) Nx.2 In accordance with the
standard theory of the firm, we assume that, over the relevant range of A^
1.APX >MPX
2. both APX and MPX are falling with A^
3. MPX falls faster than APX
so that (APX - MPX) rises with A^.
At time t0, the relative price of X (that is, Px) falls, and, so nonlabor income
must fall. After f0, however, Nx falls (see figure 4.3); hence Px rises, and (APX
- MPX) falls, which means that nonlabor income may rise or fall. As discussed
in chapter 4, we find it reasonable to assume that the net present value of the
change in nonlabor income during the entire adjustment period is negative, al
though the parameter values of the production and utility functions determine
the exact path of nonlabor income.
Figure 4.4 Movement of Wages: Case A
Wages
in sectors
XandF

= wr

t*

Time

The third dimension is the income of workers in sector Y. Here the wage is
Py MPy per employee per period, where, as before, Py = 1 (the numeraire).
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Starting at r0, Ny rises and thus MPy declines. This means that the real wage,
measured in terms of good Y, falls. However, it need not fall in terms of the real
purchasing power over goods from both sector X and sector Y. The path of wy
in figure 4.4 shows that those employees who are in sector Y at time t0 enjoy a
higher income during the adjustment period than do those in sector X.
Finally, consider nonlabor income in sector Y, which is given by (APy MPy)Ny. Let us assume, as before, that APy > MPy and that (APy - MPy) rises
with increases in Ny. At time t0, Ny begins to rise, which, in turn, raises (APy MPy). Hence, nonlabor income (measured in terms of Y) must rise.
The discussion in this section has so far been based on the assumption that
wages in industry X are flexible, in the sense that they are always equal to Px
MPX. Since wage and price stickiness seems to be quite common in many actual
economies, we will address briefly what might happen when the wage in sector
X remains at its initial level (w *) while the value of the marginal product falls
at tQ. Profit maximization by employers in industry X would require that AA^
employees be laid off, so that the equality of w * and Px MPX can be main
tained. This means that output of industry X falls and that both Px and MPX rise.
In contrast to the previous adjustments, however, employment and output in in
dustry Y do not increase.
Unemployed workers in industry X now consider two alternatives. First,
they may search for a job in that sector, and, if successful, displace another em
ployee and earn wx. Second, they may pay the adjustment costs, relocate to in
dustry Y, and earn wy (= MPy}. Let Pr be the probability that an unemployed
worker can find a job in sector X. If unemployed workers maximize their net
expected incomes, they will be indifferent between remaining in sector X and
moving to sector Y when
(A Q\
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This condition is not identical to those in equations (4.2) and (4.7©). In particu
lar, it has often been suggested that laid-off employees in industry X may be
overly optimistic about finding a job in the sector, especially when many lay
offs are temporary. This would result in an overestimate of Pr, which, in turn,
would imply a suboptimal flow of labor from industry X to industry Y.
There is another reason why the flow of labor may be suboptimal in case A.
As has been pointed out in the discussion of equation (4.7©), for the latter to be
an optimal decision rule, the market discount rate r must equal the social rate
of discount p; this equality would be ensured in perfect capital markets. How
ever, it is very likely that unemployed workers face imperfect capital markets
and that their discount rates exceed the social rate of discount. In that instance,
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the flow of labor from sector X to sector Y would be lower than the socially op
timal flow.
Case B: Employers in the Contracting Industry
Bear the Adjustment Costs
We now assume that by law or by custom, employers in the contracting sec
tor X are fully responsible for the payment of the adjustment costs of all em
ployees who separate from the sector. An employer in this industry faces the
situation in which, at time /0, the price of sector X falls, so that the value of the
marginal product of labor (Px MPX) also falls. If the wage wx does not decrease
by an equal amount, the employer lays off workers. However, as stipulated, the
employer now has to pay the costs of moving workers to industry Y. Thus, the
layoff decision is determined not only by the difference between the value of
the marginal product and the wage, but also by the adjustment costs. Specifi
cally, a profit-maximizing employer will lay off a worker when the resulting
present and future labor cost savings exceed the marginal adjustment costs.
Formally, this condition can be written as
fA i f\\ Ai / Vr \

^ I /-..
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where, as in case A, all variables are measured in units of Y. The equilibrium
rate of layoffs is obtained when the "<" is replaced by an "=" in equation
(4.10).
What is the wage level in sector X, namely, wx7 Since firms in the industry
are responsible for the adjustment costs of all workers who move (whether be
cause of layoffs or voluntary quits), wx tends to equality with the wage paid in
sector Y. To see why this is so, consider that initially wx < wy. All employees
in industry X then wish to be moved because they can earn a higher wage in
industry Y and all costs of moving are paid by firms in industry X. This, how
ever, would entail great total adjustment costs for employers in sector X, who
are, therefore, induced to maintain their wages at the level of wy. In that situa
tion, employees in sector X are indifferent between (1) staying, and (2) being
laid off and moving to sector Y. Firms in industry X initiate layoffs and transfers
of labor to industry Y. They do so at the rate N , which is implied by

(4.11)
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Thus, the system is in equilibrium when the rate of layoffs implies marginal ad
justment costs equal to the present value of the difference between the value of
the marginal product (= wage) in sector Y and the value of the marginal product
of labor in sector X.
Comparison of equations (4.2), (4.7©), and (4.11) shows that, after appropri
ate substitutions, they are all equivalent. All three imply the same socially op
timal rate of flow of labor from sector X to sector Y.
When equation (4.11) holds, then Px MPX < wx = wy = MPy throughout the
adjustment period. The marginal product of labor in sector Y determines both
industries© wages. As labor flows from sector X to sector 7, the marginal prod
uct of labor in sector Y and wages in both sectors gradually fall until the new
level of wages is attained at t*. Figure 4.5 illustrates the movement of the wagFigure 4.5 Movement of Wages: Case B
Wages
in sectors
XandY

Time
es.
What are the implications of case B for the distribution of income? Since
workers in both sectors X and Y receive identical real wages, there is no change
in the relative distribution of wage incomes. Compared with case A, however,
workers in industry X receive a higher real wage and workers in industry Y re
ceive the same real wage.
Firms in industry X must now pay the total adjustment costs (TAG). In terms
of net present value, these costs amount to
-r(T-/0)

(4.12)

TAG =
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where, as before, ty(N ) is the price per transfer and N is the number of trans
ferred employees. However, as compared with case A, there are other costs.
Prior to tQ, PX MPX = MPy, so that nonlabor income is equal to PX(APX - MPX)NX
= (Px APX - MPy)Nx. At r0, Px and» consequently, the value of the marginal
product in industry X fall. Firms in sector X, however, must continue to pay the
wage in sector Y, namely, wy = MPy > PX MPX. Hence, after t0, (PX APX - MPy)
< (PX APX - PX MPX) and this inequality is maintained until the new equilibrium
is established at t*. Thus, compared with case A, nonlabor income in sector X
is reduced: first, employers must pay adjustment costs TAC as defined by equa
tion (4.12), and, second, employers must continue to pay the relatively high Y
industry wage (wy) despite the decline in the value of labor©s marginal product
in X (that is, P^PJ. As in case A, nonlabor incomes in sector Y tend to in
crease when employers in sector X pay for the adjustment costs.
Case C: Employers in the Expanding Industry
Bear the Adjustment Costs
In this situation, employers in the expanding sector Y bear the costs of trans
ferring labor from sector X. As before, the marginal utility of Y rises in period
r0. Since by assumption, Py = 1, this means that PX MPX must be lower relative
to Py MPy and consequently wx must fall. Firms in the expanding sector Y hire
workers in sector X at a wage of w y, pay the moving costs of ())©( N ) per worker,
and then employ these individuals in sector Y, where their contribution to pro
duction is Py MPy. Employers will engage in this practice as long as the mar
ginal adjustment cost is less than the present value of the difference between
the value of the marginal product in sector Y and the wage w y. Thus, firms in
industry Y transfer the profit-maximizing number of workers from industry X
when the following condition is satisfied at any time after ?0:
(4.13)

What is the wage w y for workers who have moved from sector X and are
now working in sector Y? Since the marginal product of old and newly arrived
workers in sector Y is equal to MPy, competition among the employers in sector
Y ensures that wages must be such that w.y = w y = MPy no matter where the
workers originated or who paid the adjustment costs. It is only under imperfect
ly competitive conditions that w y may fall short of MPy. For instance, it may
be possible that employers in industry Y can contractually bind workers from
industry X to work at a wage less than MPy, in return for the payment of the
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moving costs by employers. Such indenture contracts are rarely enforceable in
courts of law, however.
Since w y is highly likely to exceed Px MPX and may well be equal to MPy,
we conclude that equation (4.13) is typically not the same as equations (4.2),
(4.7©) or (4.11). Specifically, equation (4.13) tends to lead to an adjustment rate
less than the socially optimal one. When employers in sector Y behave compet
itively in the labor market, so that w y = MPy, the profit-maximizing flow of
labor from industry X to industry Y is zero.
Case D: Government Bears the Adjustment Costs
In this situation, the government pays the adjustment costs for any worker
laid off permanently in sector X, but it has no direct control over the number of
layoffs. The adjustment costs are covered by general revenues that are financed
by general taxes or by borrowing.
As before, at time t0, MUy rises and thus Px and Px MPX fall. The wage in
sector X, however, remains at wy. Layoffs are costless to sector X employers,
and AW workers are laid off immediately; AN must be such as to maintain the
equality wy = PX MPX. The government pays, more or less immediately, the ad
justment costs for all layoffs and requires that workers relocate to sector Y. The
new equilibrium (that is, point £2 in figure 4.1) is achieved virtually instanta
neously. Given our basic assumption of rising marginal adjustment costs, this
instantaneous adjustment would be nonoptimally fast and very costly. In other
words, equation (4.2) would not be satisfied.
From Theory to Practice
We now assume that the relocation process consists of a period of unem
ployment during which employees, who have left sector X, search for or wait
for their new jobs in sector Y. Further, the duration (D) of this period of unem
ployment lengthens with the total number of workers who leave the contracting
sector. 3
Consider again case A, in which laid-off employees bear the costs of unem
ployment as well as any additional financial costs of moving from sector X to
sector Y. Further, wages in both sectors are fully flexible and adjust to their re
spective marginal products, that is, wy = MPy and wx = PX MPX at all times. Em
ployees in sector X have the choice of remaining in that industry and receiving
the wage, as in equation (4.4), of wxt = Pxt MPxt, or of leaving sector X, waiting
for a period D (measured in years), and then receiving

(4.14)

NPVy(t + D) -g©(N) =

J
t+D
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where g©(N) represents any costs of moving to sector Y additional to the cost
of waiting, and NPVy(t+D^ is the net present value at time t of the wages earned
in sector Y from period (t + D) onward.
If initially [NPVy(t+D) - g©(N )] > NPVxt, individual workers move from sec
tor X to sector Y. However, as more and more do so, the unemployment dura
tion D and the additional adjustment cost g©(N) rise, and the earnings stream
in sector Y is postponed. Hence, NPVy(t+D^ falls and g©(N) rises until the equi
librium rate of transfer is reached when [NPVy^t+D^ - g©(N)] = NPVxl, that is,
when individual workers are indifferent between (1) staying in sector X, and (2)
leaving sector X, waiting for a period of D, paying the additional financial ad
justment cost g©(N), and from then on earning wyT (= MPy^).
Thus, NPVy(t+D) - g©(N ) = NPVxt is the condition for the equilibrium rate
of transfer of labor. Let us examine this condition by, first, expressing it explic
itly:
(4.15)
t+D

Second, add
t+D

It
to both sides of equation (4.15) and rearrange to obtain:

(4.16)

Comparison of equations (4.7©) and (4.17), which follows, leads to the impor
tant conclusion that, in the model postulated in case A, the marginal adjustment
costs are the sum of the net present value of the wages foregone in sector Y be
cause of the waiting period and any additional financial adjustment costs

(4.17)

ti(N) =

t+D
Jf w y * <Tr(T ~
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Furthermore, the equilibrium rate of transfer of labor implied by equation
(4.16) is the same as that expressed in equation (4.2) which is the socially op
timal rate.
Now let us introduce a system, as in case B, where benefits are usually
charged partially to workers© previous employers in sector X. The firm©s layoff
decision can be presented formally as follows. The present value at time t
(PVBD) of the weekly unemployment benefits received by a laid-off worker is

(4.18)

PVBD =

t+D
J

where b is the weekly benefit amount (expressed at an annual rate) and D is
the duration of unemployment (measured in years, so that, for example, 0.25
stands for 13 weeks). The proportion of UI benefits paid for by firms is 0 (typ
ically 0 < 9 < 1). Thus, QPVBD represents the marginal tax cost of layoffs to
the representative firm in the contracting sector. It depends positively on the
waiting period D and the weekly benefit payments b and negatively on the rate
of interest r.
The condition for the firm©s profit-maximizing layoffs is given by the equal
ity of marginal costs and marginal benefits:

(4.19)

QPVBD = J

Is the firm©s profit-maximizing layoff rate, as determined by equation
(4.19), equal to the socially optimal rate of layoffs, as given by equation (4.16)?
To answer this question, the wage in sector X, wx in equation (4.19), needs to
be determined. This is done in the framework of two alternative assumptions
about the working of the labor market. It is assumed, first, that markets are per
fect, such that wages in sector X are flexible; the second alternative is that rel
ative wages in sector X are inflexible and are equal to wages in sector Y, that is,
When the wage rates w^ in equation (4.19) are flexible, their present value
must be determined by the equality of the properly discounted income streams
in sectors X and Y:

(4.20) jWjrtrrt ~rft = pvfl0 + J
t

t+D

78 Appendix to Chapter 4

The right-hand side of equation (4.20) consists of the earnings in sector Y
from period (t + D) onward, plus the unemployment benefits for the period t to
(t + D), less the financial costs of transferring to sector Y. It is, thus, the present
value of the net income earned in sector 7, which, in the flexible wage model,
must equal the present value of the returns from staying in sector X, namely the
left-hand side of equation (4.20). Equation (4.20) is now used to replace the
present value of the earnings stream in equation (4.19), which then becomes
t+D
(4.21)

In view of the definition of PVBD given in equation (4.18), the above condition
can be written as

(4.22)

t+D
J
t

Since 0 < 9 < 1 and b < MPy = wy (unemployment benefits average around 50
to 60 percent of wages) we conclude that, with given D and N, the left-hand
side of equation (4.22) must be less than that of equation (4.16). To maintain
the postulated equality to the right-hand side in these two equations, N and D
must be higher under the conditions of equation (4.22) than under those of
equation (4.16). Thus, imperfect experience rating, which occurs because 9 <
1, leads to nonoptimally high layoffs by firms and to levels of unemployment
that are higher than optimal (caused by the lengthening of D).
Under the second set of conditions, the relative wages in sector X are inflex
ible and are equal to the wages in sector 7, that is, wx = wy = MPy. In this case
equation (4.19) becomes

(4.23)

QPVBD = J (3fPyt -AfPJcTPJtt)rr(T © rfc.
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Comparison of equations (4. 16) and (4.23) suggests that the optimal transfer
of labor from sector X to sector Y requires, under the current assumptions, that
the marginal tax costs of layoffs, QPVBD, be equal to the present value of wy
from period t to period (t + D} plus any additional costs of transfer, or
(4.24)

t+D
t+D
6 J be~r(^~ t} di = J MP e~r( *~^dt + g© (N) .

Since, in practice 0 < 6 < 1 and b < MPy, this equality does not hold. In other
words, the profit-maximizing layoff decision implied by equation (4.23) leads
to layoffs and an unemployment duration that are in excess of the socially op
timal ones. Socially optimal layoffs and unemployment duration may be
achieved by raising 0 and/or b . For that purpose, the increase in unemploy
ment benefits b need not actually be paid to the unemployed workers. It serves
to raise the marginal costs of layoffs in equation (4.23), so that the rate of lay
offs and consequently the duration and level of unemployment are reduced to
ward their social optima.

NOTES
1. In other chapters of this book the symbol T has been used to denote the tax rate. Since the
contexts are quite different, this should not cause any confusion.
2. Nonlabor income accrues to all other factors of production and to entrepreneurs as pure
profits.
3. In this respect, the present specification differs from that of the standard search theory of
unemployment, according to which unemployed workers search until they have located their res
ervation wage. At this point, individuals terminate the period of unemployment. In the present
specification, unemployed workers take the waiting period as given, although it lengthens as the
total number of transfers from sector X to sector Y increases.

Financing the Costs
of Permanent Job Losses
Under the Reserve
and Benefit Ratio Methods
We now turn to an investigation of how the two predominant meth
ods of experience rating internalize the charged benefits of, and
thereby affect, permanent layoffs. Permanent, unlike temporary, lay
offs do entail long-run employment reductions and permanent
decreases in the taxable payroll. These decreases make the ensuing
analysis of the reserve and benefit ratio methods particularly complex.
First, we shall investigate the marginal tax costs of permanent lay
offs when the employer is and expects to remain at either the maximum
or the minimum tax rate. This analysis applies to both methods of
experience rating. Second, we examine the tax costs of permanent lay
offs under the reserve ratio method when employers are and expect to
remain on the sloped part of the tax schedule. Third, we analyze these
costs for employers who are and expect to remain on the sloped part of
the benefit ratio tax schedule. We then compare the tax costs under the
two methods of experience rating.

Minimum and Maximum Tax Rates
Consider an employer whose long-run position is at the maximum
tax rate under either the reserve or benefit ratio method of experience
rating. The employer©s tax payments are less than his/her charged ben
efits arising from temporary layoffs. Since the tax rate is fixed, there is
no automatic way in which tax payments can be raised and brought
into equality with charged benefits. Permanent layoffs will cause addi
tional charged benefits, but, since these layoffs also reduce the taxable
payroll, tax payments must fall. Hence, with increased benefits and
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reduced tax payments, the firm©s deficit in its unemployment insurance
(UI) account grows.
There is no possibility that the employer can be moved to the sloped
(that is, experience-rated) part of the tax schedule. After the temporary
increase in charged benefits due to the permanent layoffs, charged ben
efits will decline; this occurs because, with a constant temporary layoff
rate, the reduction in employment brings about a fall in temporary lay
offs. Nevertheless, the employer will remain at the maximum tax rate.
The same reasoning applies to those employers whose long-run
position is at the minimum tax rate, at which tax payments exceed
charged benefits. The increase in charged benefits due to the downward
adjustment of employment may drive the employer temporarily to the
sloped part of the tax schedule, but, in the long run, the employer must
remain at the minimum tax rate. Permanent employment reductions
lead to decreases in taxable payrolls and, at the constant minimum or
maximum tax rates, to reduced tax payments. This means that the mar
ginal tax cost of permanent layoffs is negative. Employers receive a tax
reward for permanently laying off employees.
Let us elaborate upon the preceding analysis using the notation of
chapter 2. The employer©s long-run position at the maximum tax rate
(TMAX) is characterized by the following inequality: TMAX H> N* < buN*,
where N* is the initial level of employment, w is the taxable wage base
(so that w N* is the taxable payroll), b measures the benefits paid per
unemployment spell, and u is the temporary layoff rate (so that buN*
represents the charged benefits). All variables refer to the employer©s
long-run position.
Suppose now that AW employees are laid off permanently and that
the new long-run level of employment is Af** (or N* - AAT). During the
downward adjustment from N* to Af**, charged benefits rise by bAN
because of the permanent layoffs. Once the new long-run position is
reached, however, the level of charged benefits will again be deter
mined by temporary layoffs.
In the new long-run situation, both the tax bill and charged benefits
will have fallen by the same proportion, so that benefit payments will
continue to exceed taxes, or TMAX wN** < buN**. In other words,
changes in the level of long-run employment cannot turn an excess of
benefits over taxes into a shortfall. Hence, these changes cannot move
the employer to the sloped part of the tax schedule. Such a move can
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only be achieved by increases in TMAX and w or by decreases in b and
u.
A numerical example may be helpful. Suppose that, in the initial
long run, the taxable wage base w is $7,000, the maximum tax rate
TMAX is 6 percent, the average unemployment benefit b per (temporary)
layoff spell is $3,000, the temporary layoff rate u is 15 percent, and the
beginning level of employment N* is 100. This means that, in the ini
tial long run, the employer©s tax payments are T*= ($7,000) (0.06)
(100) = $42,000, and the charged benefits are Cfl*= ($3,000) (0.15)
(100) = $45,000. Thus, the charged benefits exceed the tax payments.
Suppose now that the employer permanently lays off 10 employees.
This leads to a short-run increase in benefits of (10) ($3,000) =
$30,000. In the new long run, however, both taxes and benefits are
lower by 10 percent, namely 7**= ($7,000) (0.06) (90) = $37,800, and
Cfl**= ($3,000) (0.15) (90) = $40,500. Changes in employment cannot
convert a deficit into a surplus, but they do affect the size of the deficit.
A very similar argument is relevant to an employer whose long-run
position is at TMIN, where tax payments exceed the benefit flows, or
TMIN H>Af* > buN*. As before, a permanent reduction in the long-run
level of employment from W* to W** causes a temporary increase of
bAN in charged benefits. However, in the new long run, both taxes and
benefit payments must fall in the same proportion, and the employer©s
excess of taxes over benefits cannot be changed into a shortfall.
Because of the short-run increase in benefits, the employer may move
temporarily from TMIN to TSLOPE, but, in the new long run, the employer
must return to TMIN. Only decreases in TMIN and w or increases in b and
u can shift the employer permanently to the sloped part of the tax
schedule.
Consider now the marginal tax costs of permanent layoffs for
employers who are and remain at TMAX or TMIN. Their tax bills are
TMAX wAf* or TMIN wA^*, and so their marginal tax costs are TMAX vv AW
or TMIN H> AN, respectively. Since AN is the employment reduction, the
marginal tax cost is negative. Thus, the employers receive a marginal
reward for laying off workers permanently. When the taxable wage
base w is $7,000, the maximum tax rate TMAX is 6 percent, and the
minimum tax rate TMIN is 0.5 percent, then the annual tax reward for
laying off an employee is $420 and $35 for employers who are at TMAX
and TMIN, respectively. The net present values of these annual amounts
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is likely to be quite substantial. Ironically, employers at TMIN, who are
net contributors to the UI fund, receive a smaller tax reward from per
manent layoffs than do employers at TMAx, who are net claimants.
The marginal tax costs of temporary layoffs have been found to be
zero for employers who are located permanently at TMAX or TMIN.© For
permanent layoffs, our analysis in this section shows that the marginal
tax costs are negative and that they vary inversely with the taxable
wage base w and the tax rate, TMAX or TMIN. Thus, the marginal tax
costs will differ from state to state.

The Reserve Ratio Method of Experience Rating
We now turn our attention to those employers whose long-run posi
tion is on the sloped part of the tax schedule and examine, first of all,
the reserve ratio method of experience rating. We postulate that the
employer©s UI account is initially in a steady state, which means that
the balance does not change through time. (This balance has already
been defined in chapter 2, equation (2.3).) Its stability implies a reserve
ratio and tax rate such that an employer©s tax payments have been
brought into equality with charged benefits. For a steady state to
emerge, the level of employment, the temporary layoff rate, and the
parameters of the UI system have to remain constant for at least five
calendar years. This is implied by the lags in the reserve ratio method
described in chapter 2.
In the steady state, the employers© balances depend on their level of
employment. If the initial steady state balance is positive, then it rises
and falls equiproportionately with the level of employment. Thus, a
permanent reduction in employment of x percent leads to a decrease in
the steady state balance of x percent. The decline in the balance, in
turn, implies that total charged benefits must exceed total tax payments
during the period of adjustment: under the reserve ratio method of
experience rating, any excess of charged benefits over tax payments is
financed by a reduction in the employer©s balance.
Consequently, the difference between the steady state balances
before and after the employment reduction measures the cumulative
excess of charged benefits over tax payments. Employers need not pay
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for all the charged benefits caused by the permanent layoffs because
the reserve ratio method allows them to draw down their balances in
the UI account. This situation is the basic reason why there cannot be
complete experience rating of the charged benefits attributable to per
manent layoffs. Since we know the charged benefits caused by perma
nent layoffs and the gap between cumulative charged benefits and tax
payments, we are able to compute a marginal tax cost of permanent
layoffs. These costs are less than the marginal tax costs of temporary
layoffs.
The preceding arguments can be presented in the formal terms of
equations (2.3) to (2.5) in chapter 2. The employer©s steady state bal
ance (B*) occurs when tax payments (T) equal charged benefits (CB).
Thus, according to equation (2.3), when Tt = CBt for at least three cal
endar years, then Bt - Bt_i = Bt_2 = B*. This requires that the level of
employment (AO, the rate of temporary layoffs (w), the benefits per
unemployment spell (b), the taxable wage base (w), the intercept (a)
of the tax schedule, and the slope (s) of the tax schedule have all been
constant for at least five calendar years. In that case, the tax bill for
year t can be written as
(5.1)

T* = tvWV* = awN*-sB*,

where JV* is the initial steady state level of employment. As before, the
level of charged benefits is
(5.2)

CB* = buN* .

The equality of tax payments and charged benefits implies that
(5.3)

awN*-sB* = buN* ,

which can be solved for the steady state level of the employer©s bal
ance:
(5.4)

B* = -(aw-bu)N*.
s

This equation shows that the initial steady state balance is affected pos
itively by increases in a and w and negatively by increases in s, b, and
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u. In our subsequent discussion, the influence of changes in the steady
state level of employment W* will be especially important. The impact
of such changes on B* is positive if aw > bu and negative if aw < bu.
The inequality aw < bu implies, however, that the employer has a neg
ative steady state balance. According to the laws of most states,
employers with negative balances, and therefore negative reserve
ratios, are usually assigned the maximum tax rate (TMAX). Thus,
employers on the sloped part of the tax schedule can be presumed to
have positive balances. We consequently assume for the remainder of
this chapter that aw > bu, so that changes in N* affect B* positively.
Although the employer©s steady state balance is influenced by the
level of employment, note that both the steady state reserve ratio and
the steady state tax rate are independent of the level of employment.
The steady state reserve ratio is RR* = B*/wN*, which, in turn, equals
(a - bu/w)/s. The steady state tax rate is T* = ub/w. It follows that
employment changes cannot drive the steady state solution to TMAX or
%IN if me employer©s steady state reserve ratio and tax rate are on the
sloped part of the tax schedule.
It has been shown that the dynamic system represented by equations
(2.3), (2.4), and (2.5) is stable if RR <RR*< RR and if 0 < s < 1 .2 When
these conditions are satisfied, and if N and all the parameters of the
system have been constant through time, then RR, T, and B will con
verge to RR*, T*, and B*, no matter whether the firm starts from TMAX,
TSLOPE» r TMIN- The movement toward the steady state is achieved by
the adjustment of the tax rate and, thus, the tax bill to bring the latter
into equality with charged benefits. If initially T > CB, then T and T
fall. On the other hand, if initially, T < CB, then i and T rise.
We now postulate that there is a hypothetical employer whose UI
finance account is in a steady state on the sloped part of the tax sched
ule. This initial steady state, with its employment level of N*, is dis
turbed by permanent layoffs of AW, which reduce the level of
employment to TV** (where TV** = W* - AW, so that AW is a positive
number). During the downsizing, the employer©s charged benefits rise
by bAN, but they decline thereafter because, with a constant temporary
layoff rate, the level of these layoffs must fall with the level of employ
ment. After m years, the employer©s account is in a new steady state;
here tax payments again equal charged benefits, and the reserve ratio
and the tax rate are the same as in the initial steady state (that is, R** =
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/?*, and f** = T*). Consequently, the new steady state must again be on
the sloped part of the tax schedule. However, the employer©s steady
state balance has fallen to 5**, where #** < B*.
During the period of adjustment from J5* to 5**, total charged bene
fits must exceed total tax payments. The deficit is financed by and must
be exactly equal to the reduction in the balance. Thus, the amount of
the deficit is
(5.5)

fi*
t-m

t-m

which, according to equation (5.4), must be equal to
(5.6)

B*-B**= -(aw-bu)AN.
s

According to equations (5.4) and (5.6), the larger the intercept a of
the tax schedule and the taxable wage base w, the larger the cumula
tive shortfall of tax inflows will be. Also, the smaller the slope s of the
tax schedule and the per-employee charged benefits due to temporary
layoffs bu, the larger will be the cumulative shortfall of tax inflows.
Since the charged benefits due to permanent layoffs are bAN and the
tax shortfall is given by equation (5.6), we can compute the marginal
tax costs as the difference between the charged benefits and the tax
shortfall. In other words, if the charged benefits are not financed by a
reduction in the balance, then they must be paid via increased taxes.
Consequently, the marginal tax costs of permanent layoffs are as fol
lows:
(5.7)

Marginal Tax Costs of Permanent Layoffs
= \b--(aw-bu) \AN .
is
J

If the employer©s balance is positive, so that aw > bu, the marginal tax
cost is always less than the charged benefits caused by permanent lay
offs. Equation (5.7) implies that the marginal tax cost tends to rise with
the benefit rate b, the temporary layoff rate u, and the slope s of the tax
schedule and to fall with increases in the intercept a of the tax schedule
and the taxable wage base w.
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An arithmetic example may be helpful. Suppose that the intercept a
of the tax schedule is 0.07, the slope s is 0.25, the taxable wage base w
is $7,000, the temporary layoff rate u is 0.10, and the benefits per
unemployment spell b amount to $2,500. Then, according to equation
(5.6), for every laid-off employee, tax inflows must fall short of benefit
outflows during the adjustment period by an amount equal to [(0.07)
(7,000) - (0.10) 2,500)]/0.25 = 960. Thus, if the firm is charged the full
$2,500 for a laid-off worker, its taxes will increase by only $1,540; the
proportionate marginal tax cost is 61.6 percent. The remaining $960 is
financed by a reduction in the firm©s balance.
The discussion so far has been couched in terms of the sum of the
undiscounted tax shortfalls over the period of adjustment. This corre
sponds to the present reserve ratio method of experience rating and is
equivalent to assuming a zero interest rate. Since benefits to perma
nently laid-off employees are paid in period (t + 1) but increases in tax
payments begin only in period (t + 3), a positive rate of interest induces
rational employers to discount future tax liabilities back to period
(t + 1). This discounting reduces the present value of future tax liabili
ties and increases any tax shortfall. As the tax shortfall increases, the
marginal tax costs of layoffs must fall. Discounting by employers will
reduce the value of the marginal tax cost given by equation (5.7) and in
the numerical example of the previous paragraph.
It should be pointed out that the undiscounted tax shortfall, equal to
the decline in the steady state balance, is the same whether or not the
tax rate is constrained by TMAX during the period of adjustment. Since
/?/?** = RR* lies on the sloped part of the tax schedule, the firm must
eventually return to the initial TSLOPE. When the unconstrained reserve
ratio method generates a tax rate in excess of TMAX, the constraint
reduces tax payments and thus decreases the growth of the reserve
ratio. Since the reserve ratio method has an infinitely long memory, a
binding TMAX increases the period over which the adjustment takes
place, but it does not affect the total undiscounted tax shortfall. The
lower the TMAX, however, the later will tax payments be made; thus, the
sum of the discounted tax shortfall decreases with a decline in TMAX.
Cook (1992) found that the marginal tax cost of temporary layoffs is
equal to bAN for employers at TSLOPE facing a zero rate of interest.
Hence, employers whose steady state position is on the sloped part of
the tax schedule are completely experience rated when the rate of inter-
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est is zero. Similar results have been obtained by other researchers. Our
results show that the same conclusion does not hold for permanent lay
offs. If employers have positive balances in their UI account, then the
marginal tax cost of permanent layoffs is less than bAN, even if the rate
of interest is zero. This result seems not to have been treated before in
the literature.3
In the preceding analysis, it has been assumed that the employer
puts no value on the reduction of his/her account balance due to perma
nent layoffs. Costs arise only from taxes. This assumption appears to
be realistic in the present institutional framework, in which the
employer©s balance is simply a convenient accounting device. If the
employer could be made to value fully the reduction in the balance,
then the tax shortfall would disappear and the marginal (tax plus bal
ance) costs of permanent layoffs would be equal to charged benefits. In
chapter 6, these ideas are developed further and lead to the policy pro
posals that interest be paid on balances and that employers be given
limited opportunities to dispose of their balances.
There is one other interesting result of the foregoing discussion of
the reserve ratio method of experience rating. Equation (5.6) implies
that the tax shortfall when employment declines, measured by the
change in the balance, would be precisely equal to the tax surplus when
employment rises by an equal amount. In other words, under the
reserve ratio method, tax payments exactly equal charged benefits over
a complete employment cycle. Similarly, when some employers are
contracting and others are expanding, the former have a tax shortfall
and the latter a tax surplus, so that the aggregate balance need not be
affected much. As will be pointed out in the following section, the
same situation does not hold for the benefit ratio method.

The Benefit Ratio Method of Experience Rating
Our next step is to evaluate how the benefit ratio method works with
permanent reductions in the level of employment. For this purpose, we
postulate that the UI account of the hypothetical employer is in an ini
tial "steady state," in which the relevant variables have been constant
for at least five calendar years, so that neither the firm©s charged bene-
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fits nor its tax payments vary through time.4 It is not necessary here,
however, for tax payments to equal charged benefits.
The initial steady state is disturbed by permanent layoffs. After five
calendar years, a new steady state is established, with a lower level of
employment. All the other relevant variables have remained the same.
The question that we wish to answer is the following: Over the fiveyear period, by how much have taxes increased in response to the
charged benefits attributable to the permanent layoffs?
Two opposing factors affect the charged benefits over the period of
adjustment. First, permanent layoffs raise charged benefits; second,
with a constant temporary layoff rate, the lower permanent level of
employment reduces the level of charged benefits. Hence, when cumu
lated over five years, charged benefits may either rise or fall. The
higher the temporary layoff rate, the more likely the fall in cumulative
charged benefits.
Tax payments are also subject to two opposing forces. The decline
in the level of employment leads to an immediate reduction in the tax
able payroll and consequently to a fall in tax liabilities. On the other
hand, any increase in charged benefits may lead to a rise in the tax rate.
The net outcome cannot be determined theoretically, but, with plausi
ble assumptions about the relevant parameter values, the cumulative
tax payments will fall.
As before, the net tax shortfall is defined as the difference between
the cumulative charged benefits and the cumulative tax payments. We
have found that, in general, the tax shortfall may be positive or negative
under the benefit ratio method of experience rating and is crucially
dependent upon the slope of the tax function. When this slope is close
to unity, as it is in most states, the tax shortfall is definitely positive:
cumulative tax payments are insufficient to pay for the increased
charged benefits caused by permanent layoffs.
The marginal tax cost of a permanent layoff is less than that of a
temporary layoff under the benefit ratio method of experience rating,
as is true under the reserve ratio method. There are significant differ
ences between the tax costs of temporary and of permanent layoffs.
We will now derive these results in the framework of the model of
the benefit ratio method presented in chapter 2. Assume that the
employer©s UI account is in a steady state, which requires that the vari
ables w , TV*, u, b, c, and k have been constant for at least five years. As
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in chapter 2, c is the intercept, and k is the slope of the tax schedule.
The charged benefits amount to CB* = ubN*, the benefit ratio is BR* =
ub/w , and, assuming that the firm is on the sloped part of the tax
schedule (that is, as in figure 2.2, BR < BR* < M), the tax rate is
TSLQPE* = c + kBR*. Consequently, the employer©s tax bill in the initial
steady state is equal to
(5.8)

T* = cwN* + kubN* .

When c = 0 and k = 1, then T* = CB*= ubN*; that is, tax payments
equal charged benefits.
The initial steady state is now disturbed. At the end of year t, the
firm permanently lays off AN workers, who receive unemployment
benefits in year (t + 1). The new permanent level of employment is N**
= N* - AN. At the beginning of year (t + 6) the firm reaches a new
steady state. The new charged benefits are CB** = ub(N* - AN) = CB*
- ubAN. The steady state benefit ratio, by contrast, is independent of the
level of employment and remains at BR** = BR* = ub/w. The equality
of the two steady state benefit ratios implies that the two steady state
tax rates are also equal to one another (that is, TSLOPE**= TSLOPE*).
Thus, the new steady state tax bill is equal to
(5.9)

T**= cw (N* - AN) + hub (N* - AN) .

This means that the permanent drop in the level of employment lowers
the tax liability by T* - T** = AN(cw + kub), which reduces to T* T** = ubAN when c - 0 and k = 1. The reason for the decline in the tax
liability is that, with a constant temporary layoff rate, the reduction in
employment causes a fall in temporary layoffs.
In years (t + I) to (t + 5), the firm©s tax liability adjusts from the first
to the second steady state level. In year (t + 1), charged benefits rise by
bAN because of permanent layoffs and fall by ANub because of
reduced temporary layoffs, so that the net increase is bAN(l - u). In
years (t + 2), (t + 3), (t + 4), and (t + 5), charged benefits are below
their initial steady state level by an amount equal to ubAN. This means
that the sum of the (undiscounted) additional charged benefits over the
entire five years equals
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(5.10)
i= 1

As previously stated, when summed over the five years of transition,
charged benefits may rise or fall. The larger the temporary layoff rate,
the more probable the fall in charged benefits.
What happens to taxes during the adjustment period? Assume ini
tially that the firm remains on the sloped part of the tax schedule
throughout the adjustment period, i.e., that ir < TMAX at all times. As
specified in chapter 2, the tax rate reacts to changes in the benefit ratio
with a two-year lag. This means that the tax rates for the years (t + 1)
and (t + 2) are the same as in the initial steady state (lt+ i = it+2 =
TSLOPE*). Because of the decline in the taxable payroll, however, the tax
payments in these years must fall. These changes can be easily ascer
tained as
(5.11)

Tt + l -T* = -(cw + kub)&N and

(5.12)
The derivation of the changes in the tax bill for the years (t + 3), (t +
4), and (t + 5) is straightforward but tedious. If the firm does not reach
TMAX during the adjustment period, the changes are as follows:
(5.13)
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The sum of the (undiscounted) changes in the tax bill is equal to
5

(5.16)

^(Tt + i -T*) = -[5cw-bk(&-5u)
i= 1
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where
(5.17)

5 =

A/**

AT**© + 2N*

2#**" + N*

3

.

Since N** <N*,it can readily be shown that 8 in equation (5.17) must
be less than unity (i.e., that 5 < 1). Further, it is easy to show that 8 falls
as the relative difference between N* and N** increases.
In order to ascertain any possible tax shortfall, we simply deduct
equation (5.16) from equation (5.10):
[(CBt + i -CB*) - (Tt+ .-T*)

(5.18)

AA/"
This expression may be negative, which would imply that the firm©s tax
payments exceed its charged benefits during the years of adjustment. In
practice, the slope of the tax function k is usually equal to unity. In that
case, equation (5.18) becomes

(5.19)
i= 1

[(CB-cB*)
- (r.-r*) ]
t+i

Now the tax shortfall is always positive.
The charged benefits arising from the permanent layoffs are equal to
bAN, and the tax shortfall is given by equation (5.18). The (undiscounted) marginal tax cost is defined as the difference between the
former and the latter, namely:
(5.20)

Marginal Tax Cost of Permanent Layoffs
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Equation (5.20) implies that the larger the relative employment decline
(that is, the smaller the 8) and the benefit rate b, the larger the marginal
tax cost. Also, the smaller the intercept of the tax schedule c and the
taxable wage base w, the larger the marginal tax cost. The slope k of
the tax schedule and the temporary layoff rate u have an uncertain
impact on the marginal tax cost. When A; is 1, as it is in most benefit
ratio states, equation (5.20) reduces to (&S - 5cw )AAf.
A numerical example may again be helpful. Suppose that, as before,
the benefit per layoff spell is $2,500 and the interest rate is zero. If the
reduction in employment is 20 percent, the intercept of the tax sched
ule is 0.5 percent and the taxable wage base is $7,000, then, according
to equation (5.17), 5 is 93 percent and the marginal tax cost of one lay
off is $(68 - 5cw) = [($2,500) (.93) - (5) (.005) ($7,000)] which is
equal to $2,150 or 86 percent of the charged benefits.
Cook (1992) found that under the benefit ratio method, the marginal
tax cost of temporary layoffs with a zero rate of interest and a unitary
slope of the tax function is equal to bAN, which implies complete expe
rience rating. Equation (5.20) shows that the (undiscounted) marginal
tax costs of permanent layoffs are less than those of temporary layoffs
for two reasons: first, 8 < 1, and, second, c > 0.
Equations (5.11) to (5.20) are based on the assumption that the firm
does not reach TMAX during the period of adjustment from the initial to
the new steady state. If this assumption is incorrect and the permanent
layoffs do push the employer to TMAX temporarily, then the marginal tax
costs of permanent layoffs are reduced. This result is due to the rela
tively short memory of the benefit ratio method: past charged benefits
are soon forgotten, and the employer©s tax payments are not required to
account for them.
As in the case of the reserve ratio method discussed in the previous
section, the marginal tax costs have been computed under the assump
tion that the rate of interest is zero. This is because neither system of
experience rating currently incorporates a positive rate of interest. As
shown in the previous section, discounted marginal tax costs fall short
of undiscounted ones. They do not change the basic conclusion that the
marginal tax costs of permanent layoffs are less than those of tempo
rary layoffs.
Equation (5.19) is an expression for the tax shortfall when there is a
reduction in the level of employment. What happens when employ-
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ment rises? It turns out that the tax surplus caused by an employment
increase of AAf is equal to 5cw AN. Thus, the tax surplus in an employ
ment upswing is less than the tax shortfall in the downswing, so that,
over a complete employment cycle, taxes must fall short of charged
benefits.5 Further, in an economy where there is no no aggregate job
growth, the deficit balances of contracting employers will not be totally
offset by the surplus balances of expanding employers. Thus, the bene
fit ratio method of experience rating lacks the completely automatic
financing mechanism implied by the reserve ratio method.

The Essential Differences Between the Two Methods
As pointed out in the second section of this chapter, the two experi
ence rating methods are basically identical when the long-run position
of the employer is on the flat parts of the tax schedule. Therefore, the
present discussion is confined to those cases where the steady state
reserve and benefit ratios lie on the slope of the tax schedule. The fol
lowing differences between the reserve ratio and benefit ratio methods
of experience rating appear to be particularly relevant to permanent
layoffs.
1. Both methods of experience rating tend to generate tax shortfalls
when the level of employment is reduced. This implies that the mar
ginal tax costs of permanent layoffs are less than their charged benefits.
Under the reserve ratio method, the tax shortfall is associated with and
financed by a reduction in the employer©s balance in the UI trust fund.
Under the benefit ratio method, on the other hand, the tax shortfall is
caused by the lags in the system. After a decline in employment, the
current taxable payroll is less than the (recent) past taxable payroll, so
that the relevant benefit ratio is too low to generate the taxes for the
increased charged benefits.
The responses of the marginal tax costs to changes in the various
exogenous parameters have already been described in the last two sec
tions. For the sake of comparison, they are restated in table 5.1. The
sign predictions are the same for the taxable wage base, benefits per
unemployment spell, and the intercept of the tax function under both
methods of experience rating. When tax costs are discounted, the sign
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predictions in table 5.1 do not change with the exception that the
impact of TMAX is positive under the reserve ratio method.
Table 5.1 Impact of Parameter Changes on the Undiscounted Marginal
Tax Cost
Parameter increases
Taxable wage base
Benefits per unemployment spell
Temporary layoff rate
Maximum tax rate
Relative change in employment level
Slope of tax function
Intercept of tax function
a. Direction of impact is indeterminate.

Experience rating method
Reserve ratio
Benefit ratio
+
+
+
0
0
+
0
+
a
-

2. When there is a relatively "long-run" employment cycle that is,
a decline in employment of A/V followed after several years by an
increase of AN—then the tax shortfall in the downswing is equal to the
tax surplus in the upswing under the reserve ratio method. Over the full
cycle, benefit outflows equal (undiscounted) tax inflows. By contrast,
under the benefit ratio method, there is a shortfall in the downswing but
no tax surplus in the upswing. Consequently, the benefit ratio method
implies a tax shortfall over the entire employment cycle.
3. During the period of adjustment from a high to a low long-run
level of employment, the employer may temporarily reach the maxi
mum tax rate TMAX under either method of experience rating. Under the
reserve ratio method, this temporary maximum tax rate does not affect
the total (undiscounted) tax shortfall. The employer will have to make
up the lost taxes at a later time. By contrast, under the benefit ratio
method, because of its short memory, the tax shortfall is never offset.
Hence, the lower the binding TMAX, the larger the tax shortfall.
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Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we have examined the extent to which the two meth
ods of experience rating internalize the costs of permanent layoffs. We
have concluded that neither method internalizes these costs com
pletely, even when the employer©s account is placed on the slope of the
tax schedule. This result is different from those obtained for temporary
layoffs by other researchers. When the firm is always on the slope of
the tax schedule, both methods of experience rating typically internal
ize all the (undiscounted) charged benefits of temporary layoffs but
only part of the charged benefits of permanent layoffs.
The two experience-rating methods react differently to these condi
tions because the tax base, namely, the taxable payroll, remains con
stant with temporary layoffs, but declines with permanent layoffs. The
decline in the taxable payroll reduces the tax bill and thus counteracts
the rise in the tax rate due to the increase in charged benefits. Thus,
payroll taxes are not the ideal means of internalizing the charged bene
fits of permanent layoffs.
When the firm is and remains at the maximum or the minimum tax
rate, it receives a tax reward for laying off workers permanently and
has a zero tax cost of temporary layoffs. Hence, our research supports
the frequently made recommendation of increased maximum tax rates
and decreased minimum tax rates: the tax costs of temporary layoffs
would rise and the tax rewards for permanent layoffs would fall for
those employers who are moved from the flat to the sloped section of
the tax schedule.
We next consider which method of experience rating is superior in
internalizing the charged benefits of permanent layoffs. Simple arith
metic examples have shown that realistic parameters values lead to
(undiscounted) marginal tax costs that are somewhat higher for the
benefit ratio than for the reserve ratio method. Nevertheless, we regard
the reserve ratio method as superior for two reasons. First, when the
steady state tax rate is on the slope of the tax schedule, the change in
the employer©s UI account balance measures the tax shortfall under the
reserve ratio method. Thus, if employers can be made to value fully
their balances, then complete internalization of charged benefits would
occur. Second, as indicated before, both methods of experience rating
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suffer from the shortcoming that future tax payments are not dis
counted. This can be remedied easily in the case of the reserve ratio
method, simply by paying interest on positive balances and charging
interest on negative balances. Under the benefit ratio method, by con
trast, there is no balance, so that neither of these two changes could be
effected.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Card and Levine (1994) or our own discussion in chapter 2.
2. See Brechling( 1977).
3. There is an inconsistency in the empirical work of Card and Levine (1992). They use their
estimates of the marginal costs of temporary layoffs in equations for permanent layoffs. Since the
marginal tax costs of permanent layoffs are less than those of temporary layoffs, their tax cost
coefficients for permanent layoffs are likely to have a downward bias.
4. We use the term "steady state" somewhat loosely here to describe simple constancy through
time. Usually the term is used in truly dynamic systems in which at least one variable depends on
its own value in a previous period. The benefit ratio method is essentially static but with lags, so
that the endogenous variables depend only on the exogenous ones from the current and previous
periods.
5. The technical reason why the tax surplus in the upswing is less than the tax shortfall in the
downswing is that permanent layoffs qualify for UI benefits but there are no equivalent positive
contributions on behalf of new permanent hires.

Policy Recommendations
for Improving
Unemployment Insurance Financing
The experience-rating provisions of unemployment insurance (UI)
financing are designed to internalize in part the costs of unemployment
to the employer, who is the proximate cause of the job loss. These pro
visions imply incentives to firms to reduce layoffs and, hence, unem
ployment. Empirical research has shown that the incentives of
experience rating may be sufficiently powerful to decrease layoffs sub
stantially.

Summary
In this study, we have examined the nature and working of experi
ence rating in the U.S. UI system, which, as previously discussed, is
distinctive in being financed by an experience-rated payroll tax. Most
previous research in this area has been concerned with temporary lay
offs, which are responses to temporary fluctuation in the demand for
labor and do not require any structural adjustment. For temporary lay
offs, UI provides the important service of income support. Our primary
emphasis in this book, by contrast, has been on the costs of permanent
layoffs or job losses that involve the contraction of some sectors of the
economy and the expansion of others. Specifically, we have asked the
following three questions:
1. How important are permanent in relation to temporary layoffs?
2. Who should bear the costs of permanent layoffs?
3. How do current methods of experience rating internalize these
costs to employers?
We have attempted to answer these questions in chapters 3, 4, and 5,
respectively.
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Our basic findings are as follows. First, our empirical work suggests
that permanent layoffs may constitute as much as 70 percent of all lay
offs. Consequently, we believe that there is a valid rationale for exam
ining experience rating and its effects on permanent layoffs.
Second, to obtain a socially optimal rate of structural adjustment,
the agents who pay for the adjustment costs should also control the rate
of adjustment. This rules out government financing from general reve
nues. Further, payment by employers in the expanding sectors cannot
be administered. Payment by dismissed workers may work well if
wages are flexible and capital markets are perfect. Payment by employ
ers in the contracting sectors is likely to work even if wages are inflex
ible. Hence, there is a strong prima facie case for experience rating in
the case of permanent layoffs.
Third, the charged benefits caused by permanent layoffs cannot be
fully experience rated under either the reserve ratio or the benefit ratio
method. This contrasts with the results obtained for temporary layoffs.
When employers are on the sloped parts of the tax schedules, the
(undiscounted) marginal tax costs of temporary layoffs are equal to
charged benefits. The marginal tax costs of permanent layoffs, on the
other hand, are less than the charged benefits. When employers are at
the maximum and minimum tax rates, the marginal tax costs of tempo
rary layoffs are zero and those of permanent layoffs are negative. In
other words, at these tax rates employers receive a tax reward for per
manent layoffs. As discussed in chapter 5, the difference between the
effects of temporary and permanent layoffs is due to the declines in the
tax base that occur only in the case of permanent layoffs.

Policy Implications
Our policy implications are based on the premise that an increased
degree of interaalization of the costs of unemployment is desirable and
that the present institutional and legal structure cannot be changed rad
ically. Our policy findings are both "old" and "new."
Many other researchers have come to the conclusion that the maxi
mum tax rate ought to be raised under either method of experience rat
ing. Our research supports this view. As a result, our first policy
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recommendation is the following: Maximum tax rates should be raised
substantially or even be eliminated. Minimum tax rates should be
reduced or even be eliminated.
Under both methods of experience rating, there are substantial time
lags between the payment of unemployment benefits and the resulting
changes in taxes. In the absence of discounting, these lags undermine
the working of experience rating. They result in interest-free loans to
employers with high and rising charged benefits. We therefore recom
mend that the administrative lag in the determination of the employer's
tax rate be reduced to a minimum. Modern computing systems should
allow the 1995 tax rate, for example, to be based on the reserve or ben
efit ratio at the end of 1994.
From many points of view, the differences between the reserve ratio
and the benefit ratio methods of experience rating are not substantial.
However, we favor the reserve ratio method of experience rating
because it appears to be more readily adaptable to relatively minor
changes that would increase its efficiency in internalizing the costs of
unemployment. The reserve ratio method is superior in this respect as
it is based on the firm©s balance, which is a summary of previous
charged benefits and tax payments. The benefit ratio method has no
such summary.
Under the reserve ratio method, the decline in the employer©s bal
ance measures the tax shortfall due to permanent layoffs when the
employer©s long-run (steady state) position is on the slope of the tax
schedule and any movements to the maximum or minimum rate are
temporary. Thus, if the employer could be made to value fully the
decline in the balance, full experience rating would occur. We present
three policy recommendations designed to induce employers to place
an appropriate value on their trust fund balance.
1. An employer's positive balance in the UI trust fund should be
treated as pan of the employer's assets; a negative balance
should be treated as a liability. The inclusion of positive and neg
ative UI balances in the balance sheet would improve it as a
reflection of employers© true financial status.
2. Upon cessation of business, due to bankruptcy, for example, an
employer's positive balance should be refunded, and any nega
tive balance should be payable in full. Business closures have
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been a troublesome issue for the UI system. When an employer
goes out of business and lays off the entire work force, the tax
able payroll falls to zero and, as a result, the (payroll) tax liabili
ties disappear. However, the former employees qualify for and
receive unemployment benefits. At present, the UI system cannot
claim part of the employer©s remaining assets for the reimburse
ment of the UI benefits. The UI system should be allowed to lay
claim to the remaining assets to cover any negative balances.
Similarly, any positive balance should be returned to the owners.
3. Interest should be paid on positive balances and charged on neg
ative balances. The states© UI trust funds receive interest from the
federal government, and it seems fair and proper that interest be
paid by the trust funds to employers with positive balances. Fur
ther, interest should be charged to employers with negative bal
ances. Interest on negative balances, however, should be cash
charges and not be added to negative balances. Positive interest
payments should be added to the positive balance.
Interest payments on positive and negative balances are important
for at least two reasons. They give an inducement to employers, first, to
avoid negative balances, and second, to build up positive ones. Typi
cally, charged benefits occur now, and the corresponding taxes occur
several years afterwards. At present, the system does not account for
this difference by discounting future tax liabilities. A simple way of
resolving the discounting problem under the reserve ratio method of
experience rating is to pay (charge) interest on positive (negative) bal
ances. No such simple method of dealing with the discounting problem
seems to exist under the benefit ratio method.
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